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~ l))~ ~ In Re: No. 81-89, Zant ~ CAPITAL/Federal Habeas , 
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~~~-~-- , The Geo. AG (petr) has filed a response addressing the 
"ripeness" issue. This memo discusses both that issue and the 
merits. After looking at the papers and the decision of the CAS 
below, which I think is probably wrong, I recommend a grant on the 
merits if the h=ase is ripe • 
. ..:.t ~ ~ v( ~ .- ~~ 
~~ 
As mentioned in the memo and as discussed in my initial 
note, resp argued that this case is not ripe for review because the 
CAS remanded to the DC to consider three additional arguments. 
Those arguments were first raised on appeal to the CAS by amicus: --the NAACP Legal Defense Fund "invited" "the Court's attentiom to 
- - 2. 
three additional issues [in addition to those raised by resp]: (1) 
whether the trial judge should have ordered a competency hearing in 
light of petitioner's conduct at trial; (2) whether petitioner was 
denied effective assistance of counsel because of counsel's 
inablitity to communicate with him; and (3) whether petitioner's 
uncounseled confession was knowing and voluntary, in view of 
allegations that it was given while appellant was under the 
influence of drugs." See slip op. at 42, reprinted in Petition at 
42. Because these issues could relate to guilt, not just the death / 
sentence, the CA5 remanded for the DC to take appropriate action. 
In his reply brief, petr (the Geo. AG) argues that the 
remand should be ignored in deciding whether to grant cert because 
it is flagrantly inconsistent with this Court's decisions on waiver 
by deliberate failure to raise an issue in the state-court habeas 
proceeding, citing Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972). Murch, 
howev~r, involved a Maine habeas statute which provided that a petr 
for post-conviction relief must raise all constitutional challenges 
in a single proceeding, and the Geo. AG does not cite a similar Geo. 
statute. I have found a Geo. case holding that an earlier habeas 
~ ---• ll 
as to any issues that could have been proceeding is res judicata 
~ "\ . . " raised therein. See Wells ------ -------------------- - - ---v. Keith, 213 Geo. 858 (1958). There is also a Geo. statute (on habeas procedures) providing that a federal 
constitutional right can be relinquished only by a voluntary, 




Murch is relevant to the case at bar only if a Geo.
4
would 
hold that the three constitutional claims first raised to the CA5 on 
- - 3. 
appeal cannot now be raised in a Geo. habeas proceeding because Geo. 
law is similar to Maine's. I am not at all sure what a Geo. court 
would hold. 
This discussion suggests, however, that this Court cannot, 
at this point and on the basis of the papers before it, simply 
ignore the remand in making the cert decision because the remand is 
such a clear violation of Murch. Moreover, whether there has been a 
waive~ is likely to turn on the presence of "cause and prejudice"---and the record contains no evidence relevant to that point. 
Presumably, such evidence will be brought forward on the remand. 
One way to handle this case for now would be to hold for No. 
80-846, Rose v. Lundy (must prisoner exhaust all state habeas claims 
before seeking relief in federal courts?). If Rose holds that he 
must, then the federal habeas petition should be dismissed until 
such time as resp has raised these issues in Geo. habeas. 
The Merits 
The jury was told that it could ie e0t1ld impose death if it 
found a3 o~e of the four following factors: (1) the offense was 
committed by one who had escaped from lawful custody; (2) the 
offense was committed by one having a prior conviction for a capital 
felony; (3) the offense was committed by one having a substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions; @!) 4) the 
offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. 
Pursuant to Geo. procedures, the jury returned a verdict 
expressly stating which of these circumstances were present in this --------case. It found 1, 2, & 3 present. While the appeal was pending, 
the Geo. S. Ct., in another case, held that reason (3) was 
~ 
- -
unconstitutionaly vague and, therefore, an impermissible basis for 
imposing death. 
4. 
On appeal, the Geo. s. Ct. applied its settled rule that a 
death sentence can be sustained when ~ ne circumstanc: ' is held ...... .......... --- --invalid but the jury has found another (constitutionally-----permissible) circumstance present. This Geo. rule was settled prior 
to this Court's denial of cert (without remand) in post-Godfrey 
cases in which the jury had found a constitutionally permissible 
circumstance in addition to the constitutionally impermissible 
(b) (7) circumstance (the one held too vague in Godfrey). See Drake 
v. Zant, 101 s. Ct. 541, 542-43 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the denial of cert and explaining that remand was not needed because 
it was clear that Geo. regarded it sufficient if one of the 
circumstances found present by the jury was sustained on appeal.). 
After exhausting state habeas, our petr sought relief in DC. 
In th~ roceeding, the CA5 initially held that resp's death 
sentence could not stand because the jury might not have imposed 
death had it not known about the prior record of "assaultive 
criminal activities" relevant to impermissible circumstance. After 
the petition for rehearing was filed, the CA5 changed the opinion. 
Apparently, the jury would have known about resp's prior record even 
if (3) were not a circumstance justifying death, and the corrected 
CA5 opinion reasons that "[t]he instruction on the invalid 
circumstance may have unduly directed the jury's attention to his 
[resp's] prior convictions. It cannot be determined with the degree 
of certainty required in capital cases that the instructions did not 
• 
- -
make a critical difference in the jury's decision to impose the 
death penalty." 
5 • 
I think the denial of cert in Drake suggests that this Court 
would not agree. Justice White, in his dissent from the denial in 
Drake (on the ground that there should be a remand so that the Geo. 
S. Ct. could decide whether, as a matter of Geo. law, it considered 
a sentence sustainable when one of two or more circumstances found 
present by the jury was not sustained on appeal), indicated that he 
did not think the rule actually applied in this case would violate 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The memo suggests 
that there may be disagreement within the Court regarding the 
relevance of Stromberg, but that is a reference to a dissent filed 
by Justice Stewart in a companion case. See Martin v. Louisiana, 
101 S. Ct. 540 (1980). ,, 
Stromgberg certainly does not apply directly to cases such 
as this one. The Stromberg rule is only that, when the reviewing 
? 
court cannot tell from the record whether the jury relied on the 
unconstitutional ground rather than the constitutional ground, a 
general verdict cannot be sustained. Here, we know from the record 
that the jury relied on two constitutional grounds. The only 
question is whether the jury's decision to impose death was somehow 
influenced by the fact that it had found three bases for the decsion 
rather than two. 
A rule such as the one adopted by the CA5 below--that a 
trial is necessary when one of several grounds for imposing the 
death penalty is held unconstitutional--may place undesirable 
pressure on the Geo. S. Ct. Whenever it finds a circumstance 
- - 6. 
unconstitutional, every death-row inmate whose sentence was imposed 
on the basis of that circumstance {no matter how many other 
permissible circumstances were also found) will be entitled to a new 
trial on the sentence. {The proceeding is bifurcated; a new trial 
on guilt would not seem necessary.). The result of the CAS rule may 
be a Geo. s. Ct. hesitant to find any circumstance unconstitutional. 
I think it is quite likely the CA5 decision is wrong and 
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2. FACTS: Resp was tried and convicted in January 1975 for 
the murder of Roy Asbell. Finding three aggravating 
circumstances to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury 
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been convicted for a capital felony; (2) resp had a substantial 
history of serious assaultive convictions; and (3) resp was an 
escapee when he committed the murder. While resp's appeal was 
pending, thev&a . Sup. Ct. held unconstitutional that portion of -------the Georgia Code which permits the death penalty where a murder 
is committed by a person with a substantial history of assaultive 
( 
convictions. Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 3386 (1976). The Ga. 
J Sup. Ct., however, upheld resp's death penalty on the basis of 
l the other two aggravating circumstances found by the jury. 
Stephens v. State, 227 S.E.2d 261 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
986 (1977). On state habeas, the Ga. Sup. Ct. again rejected 
petr's contention that the fact that the jury was allowed to 
consider an aggravating circumstance later held to be 
unconstitutional required that the death penalty be vacated. 
Stephens v. Hopper, 247 S.E.2d 92 2,.9~.:l), cert. denied, 439 
991 (1978). A federal district court denied habeas relief. 
3. DECISION BELOW: The CA { rejected a number of 
contentions not relevant here, but agreed with resp that his 
U.S. 
death sentence could not stand because the jury had considered an 
J unconstitutional aggravating circumstance. The court based this 
conclusion on the line of cases from this Court starting with 
Stromberg _v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). In Stromberg, the 
Court held that if a jury has been instructed to consider several 
grounds for conviction, one of which proves to be 
unconstitutional, and the reviewing court is thereafter unable to 
determine from the record whether the jury relied on the 
unconstitutional ground, the verdict must be set aside. See also 
- -
-3-
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); Street v. New York, 
394 U.S. 576 (1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
The court held this principle to be particularly applicable to 
capital cases, under the rule that a death penalty may not be 
imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial 
risk that the penalty will be inflicted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner. The sentencer's discretion must be rationally 
reviewable by the appellate process. In a case like this, 
however, it is impossible for the appellate court to determine 
satisfactorily that the sentence was not decisively effected by 
an unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance.l 
The court also directed the DC on remand to consider three 
"---- ~ ,,,,......,,,_ 
issues brought to the court's attention by an amicus brief filed 
by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. These issues had not been 
previously considered by the DC. 
Judge Clark dissented with respect to parts of the opinion 
not relevant here. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the decision of the CA 
5 is in direct conflict with decisions of the Ga. Sup. Ct. The 
law in Georgia is now well-settled that if a death penalty is 
imposed on the basis of a plurality of aggravating circumstances, 
each of which has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
j 4 
1 In its original op1n1on, the CA ~ also argued that the 
presence of the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance made it 
possible for the jury to consider several prior convictions, 
which otherwise would not have been before it. Apparently this 
was error. In its opinion denying the petition for rehearing, 





death penalty will not be set aside because one of those 
aggravating circumstances is set aside. Justice Stevens reached 
this conclusion concerning Georgia law in his concurring opinion 
in Westbrook v. Balkcom, 101 S.Ct. 541 (1980) (denying 
certiorari). Petr distinguishes the Stromberg line of cases on 
the ground that, unlike this case, all involved general verdicts 
of guilty. Petr also argues that Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976), implicitly upheld the Georgia procedure, because Gregg's 
death penalty was upheld even though the Georgia state court had 
previously ruled that a separate death penalty for armed robbery 
was disproportionate. 
Resp relies upon the reasoning of the CA 5 concerning the 
application of Stromberg. He also argues that this case is an 
inappropriate vehicle by which to consider the application of the 
Stromberg doctrine to capital sentencing verdicts. The CA 5 has 
remanded the case to the DC to address three constitutional 
issues concerning resp's guilt which were not previously 
consiaered by the DC. Thus, the DC may still reverse resp's 
conviction and this would require a new trial on both guilt and 
sentencing. 
Two amicus briefs have been filed. The Louisiana Attorney 
General argues that the decision of the CA 5 directly conflicts 
with Louisiana statutory provisions and a recent decision of the 
La. Sup. Ct. State v. Sonnier, So.2d (La. 1981). The 
Montana Attorney General states that this situation is likely to 
arise shortly in Montana and, therefore, the applicable principle 





5. DISCUSSION: A disagreement within this Court over the 
application of Stromberg to sentences of death was exhibited in 
the various opinions written in Martin v. Louisiana, 101 S.Ct. 
540 (1980) (J. Stewart, dissenting): and Westbrook v. Balkcom, 
supra (J. WHITE, dissenting: J. STEVENS, concurring in the denial 
of certiorari). The Court has consistently denied review in 
cases in which the state court has upheld a death sentence, 
despite a conclusion that one of several aggravating 
circumstances found to exist could not be sustained. Now that a 
direct conflict has developed on this issue, I believe the Court 
should give it plenary consideration and set forth the 
appropriate principle~. · Moreover, reconsideration of the 
application of Stromberg to death sentences may be appropriate in 
light of Bullington v. Missouri, 
I recommend a GRANT. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: David Levi 
February 23, 1982 
No. 81-89: Zant v. Stephens 
Question Presented 
When a jury imposes a death sentence, after finding 
more than one aggravating circumstance, must that sentence be 
vacated when one of the aggravating circumstances is 
subsequently set aside? 
-
- - 2. 
I. Decisions Below 
On August 21, 1974, Stephens escaped from the 
Houston County, Georgia jail where he was waiting trial for 
murder and armed robbery. 1 After escaping, he broke into the 
home of Charles Asbell and was burglarizing the house when Roy 
Asbell interrupted him. Stephens beat Asbell and then drove 
him to a secluded spot where he shot him twice in the head, 
killing him. 
The jury was instructed as to four statutory 
aggravating circumstances: (1) that the offense of murder was 
- committed by a person with a prior record of conviction of a 
-
capital felony; (2) that the murder was committed by a person 
who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal 
convictions; (3) that the offense of murder was committed by a 
person who had escaped from the lawful custody of a peace 
officer or a place of lawful confinement; and (4) that the 
offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman 
in that it involved torture depravity of mind or an aggravated 
battery to the victim. The jury found the fir st 3 of the 
aggravating circumstances and recommended the death penalty. 2 
1Prior to his murder trial in the Asbell case, Stephens 
was convicted of the earlier murder and armed robberies for which 
he had been waiting trial. 




- - 3. 
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. It 
found that the death sentence in this case was not excessive 
nor disproportionate to the penalty in similar cases 
considering both the crime and defendant. It rejected 
Stephens' claim that the sentence should be vacated on the 
basis of Arnold v. Sttes, 236 Ga. 534 (1976), decided after 
Stephen's trial, in which the Georgia s.c. held that "the 
portion of Code Ann. § 2702534, 1 (b) (1), which allows for the 
death penalty where a 'murder is committed by a person who has 
a substantial history of serious assaultive convictions,' is 
unconstitutional and thereby, unenforceable." The Arnold 
court found that the term "substantial" was too vague and that 
2It is worth noting that although the courts below--both 
state and federal--have treated the first two of these 
aggravating circumstances as two independent statutory 
aggravating circumstances, in fact they are ? ubparts of a single 
agg_ravating circumstance. The first of the aggravating 
circumstances in the Georgia statute provides: "(l) The offense 
of murder, rape [etc] was committed by a person with a prior 
record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of 
murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of 
serious assaultive criminal convictions." The jury instruction 
was true to the statutory language and treated these "two" 
circumstances as one. The jury was therefore told that it could 
find any of three aggravating circumstances--not four as I have 
presented it in text. The return by the jury lists two 
aggravating circumstances, although the jury specifically found 
both halves of the first aggravating circumstance. Since the 
state supreme court treats the jury as finding three aggravating 
circumstances, I do not think anything will turn on this 
observation. However, if could be argued that since the jury 
properly found one of the halves of the first aggravating 
circumstance it is simply irrelevant whether or not they properly 
found the other half. No one makes this argument, although I 




- - 4. 
juries would give it widely varying meanings. 
The Georgia court found that Arnold was 
distinguishable. There the defective aggravating circumstance 
was the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury. 
Under the death statute the jury must find at least one 
aggravating circumstance to impose the death sentence. 
Therefore, it was necessary in that case to vacate the 
sentence. Here, by contrast, the evidence supports the jury's 
findings of the other statutory aggravating circumstances, and 
"consequently the sentence is not impaired" despite the jury's 
partial reliance upon the defective aggravating circumstance. 
Stephens then applied for state habeas, again 
unsuccessfully. Again the Georgia Court addressed the claim 
that Arnold required that the sentence be vacated. On habeas 
Stephens argued that the sentence could not stand because 
"presenting evidence to the jury to support that invalid 
aggravating circumstance was prejudicial error." The court 
rejected this variant of the argument handily. The evidence 
introduced by the state in support of the invalid aggravating 
circumstance was Stephens' criminal record. Under the Georgia 
code the record of any prior criminal convictions is 
admissible at sentencing. This evidence was therefore 
--------~ • 
admissible at the penalty phase in any event and did not 
- - ----




- - 5. 
Stephens then began federal habeas proceedings. The v 
district court dismissed his petition, but the CA5 granted him 
relief on the basis of his Arnold argument. The CA found that 
imposition of the death sentence, after one of the aggravating 
circumstances relied upon by the jury was held invalid, 
/ violated Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). In 
Stromberg the jury was instructed to consider several grounds 
for conviction, one of which was later held unconstitutional. 
Because the reviewing court had no way of determining whether 
the jury reached its verdict on the basis of the 
unconstitutional ground, the Court ordered the verdict set 
aside. The Stromberg rule applies with particular force in 
the context of death sentencing where the Court has emphasized 
the necessity for channeling the jury's discretion by clear 
standards, so as to make the process "rationally reviewable": 
~ 
"It is impossible for a reviewing court to determine 
satisfactorily that the verdict in this case was not 
decisively affected by an unconstitutional statutory 
aggravating circumstance. The jury had the authority 
to return a life sentence even if it found statutory 
aggravating circumstances. It is possible that even 
if the jurors believed that the other aggravating 
circumstances were established, they would not have 
recommended the death penalty but for the decision 
that the offense was committed by one having a 
susbtantial history of serious assaultive er iminal 
convictions, an invalid ground." 
- This holding by the CA5 is none to clear. ---- . It appears to be part due process and part Eighth Amendment. It 
-
- - 6. 
depends in part on the idea that the jury's discretion is not 
properly channelled if it is permitted to consider invalid 
factors in reaching its conclusion. And it depends in part on 
the sense that the jury's verdict cannot be properly 
supervised if the jury may have reached its conclusion, in 
part, for reasons that are invalid. 
In addition to the Stromberg/Eighth Amendment ground 
for reversal, the CA also argued that the instruction on the 
invalid aggravating factor made it possible for the jury to 
consider several prior convictions that would otherwise not 
have been before it. On rehearing, the CA realized that this 
- was not an accurate statement; as the Georgia Supreme Court 
had found on state habeas the evidence of Stephens' former 
convictions was admissible in any event. The CA altered its 
-
argument to focus not on the admission, but on the emphasis, 
..... 11.w;.W =-= • 
of the evidence: "The instruction on the invalid circumstance 
may have unduly directed the jury's attention to his prior 
convictions. It cannot be determined with the degree 
certainty required in capital cases that the instruction did 
not make a critical difference in the jury's decision to 
impose the death penalty. " 
II. Argument of the Parties 
A. The State 
-
- - 7. 
&,..t-
The best statement of the reasons for reversal i ~ 
found in the amicus brief submitted by Alabama, California, 
and several other states. The argument runs as follows: The 
Georgia death statute lists 10 aggravating circumstances and 
requires that the jury must find at least one of these 
aggravating circumstances to impose the death sentence. By 
this requirement the statute insures that only certain classes 
of criminals--those who satisfy one of the aggravating 
circumstances--will be executed. This Court has been 
concerned in these cases that the death penalty be applied 
with some consistency. By requiring the jury to find at least 
- one aggravating circumstance and by providing for review by 
the Supreme Court of Georgia 3 this concern for consistency is 
met. 
-
But, the argument continues, having found that at 
least one aggravating factor is present, and that death may be 
imposed, the jury must then decide whether it should impose 
death. And in making this inquiry the jury weighs the 
evidence of' aggravation and mitigation--not the statutory 
3on appeal the Supreme Court of Georgia determines: "(1) 
Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and (2) 
whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the 
evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance as enumerated in section 27-2534.l(b), 
and (3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
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factors. That is, having used the statutory factors to 
determine if the threshold requirement of one aggravating 
circumstance is met, the statutory factors become essentially 
irrelevant. Thus, the jury does not add up the number of 
aggravating circumstances listed in the statute and compare 
the number of such factors to the number of mitigating 
factors. Rather, it looks to all of the evidence: "The jury 
or trial judge does not weigh the statutory language of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it weighs the 
evidence which aggravates or mitigates the murder committed." 
Brief at 12. 
The argument concludes that since the jury in this 
case found two aggravating circumstances that were valid, the 
function of the aggravating circumstance inquiry in limiting 
the jury's discretion was fulfilled. Having determined that 
the death penalty might be imposed, it was up to the jury to 
decide whether in view of the evidence before it Stephens 
deserved to die. The jury reached its conclusion upon 
properly admitted evidence. The fact that one of the 
aggravating factors was invalid did not affect the evidence 
put before it. 
The argument is summarized as follows: ~ 
"The ultimate points to be made about this case are 
two. First, the invalidity of the third sttutory 
aggravating circumstance had no possible impact upon 
whether the death penalty could be imposed in this 
case because there remained two valid aggravating 
circumstances found by the jury, either one of which 





of capital punishment as an alternative. Second, 
the invalidity of the third statutory aggravating 
circumstance had no possible impact upon whether the 
death penalty should be imposed in this case because 
it had qo effe.c,t what,..s.oever upon the 1~ vidence"~ which 
was before the jury ;n" Brief at 19. 
9. 
Also in support of the State's position are the -
opinions by Justices White ---- and Stevens, dissenting and concurring 
Westbrook 
in the denial of certiorari, in Dr_al<~ _ y_! __ z?_I'lS 
v. Balkcom, 449 U.S. 999 (1980) • Justice 
argued: 
"The cases now before us involve only sentencing, 
not guilt or innocence, and there is no 
constitutional right to jury sentencing. The 
imposition of a death sentence, despite a failure to 
sustain all of the aggravating circumstances found 
by the jury, does not conflict with either Stromberg 
.•. or Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). The 
Georgia Supreme Court has held that under Georgia 
law it has the power to determine whether or not a 
death sentence should be imposed under these 
circumstances. As I see it, this does not violate 
the United States Constitution." 
White 
Justice Stevens stated that since the Georgia 
Supreme Court's position was clear, that a death sentence 
would not be disturbed if one of several aggravating 
circumstances was found invalid, further review was 






state's :position will 
this section, 
Ll 
depend on two 
- 10. 
the strength of the - t, ~
factors. ~ , as 
indicated by Justice White's dissent, does Georgia Supreme 
Court review of the sentence mean that any error in jury 
sentencing is eventually corrected. And E~ is it credible 
(and would it be constitutional if true) that the aggravating 
circumstances act only as a threshold requirement and that 
once the jury finds one aggravating circumstance these 
statutory factors become irrelevant to its decision to impose 
the death sentence. 
B. Respondent's Argument 
The argument on the other side is well stated in 
Stephens' brief. He argues that since the whole purpose of 
the aggravating circumstance inquiry is to focus the jury's 
attention on certain relevant factors, we may assume that the 
jury was influenced by its consideration of an invalid 
statutory factor. Moreover, the fact that the jury must 
specifically list the statutory that in 
reaching its sentence, and the fact 
aggravating circumstance would seem to show that the jury was 
influenced by this factor. At the least, no reviewing court 
can say with certainty that the jury was not so influenced. 
Finally, it does not comport with the Court's insistence that 






instructed on an invalid ground. "To summarize 
the fundamental procedural safeguards approved 











jury's task of weighing the 
mitigating factors~ jury 
articulation of its sentencing rationale as a basis for 
meaningful appellate sentence review---would go for naught if 
a sentence could be affirmed despite uncertainty as to the 
possible influence of an unconstitutional sentencing 
instruction." Breif at 29-30. 
In addition to the above Eighth argument, 
e Stephens also advances a due process argument based on 
Stromberg, supra, and Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980). 
The essence of this argument is that we have no way of knowing 
what the jury would have done had they not been instructed on 
the invalid aggravating circumstance. They were not required 
to impose a death sentence simply because they found several 
aggravating circumstances. They were only permitted to do so. 
Whether they would have done so on the basis only of the valid 
aggravating circumstances is unclear. The risk that the jury 
would not have imposed the same sentence is intolerable in a 
death case. 
-
Finally, Stephens points to the impressive fact that 
quite a number of state supreme courts have reached the same 
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if one of the aggravating factors found by the jury is 
subsequently invalidated. 
III. Analysis ,__ ____  
I do not think that there is a great deal to be said 
in this case. I find that S~ s has the best of the 
argument, and would affirm the CAS. I do not like this result 
very much for two reasons. Stephens' is a ruthless two-time 
killer and there are a huge number of cases being held for 
this one. It must be discouraging to the state to keep 
getting reversed in capital cases. At some point they may 
give up altogether. Yet many state courts have seen this 
problem to be one requiring re-setencing, and I think that 
y"' 
particularly the decision in Hicks is powerful support for 
affirmance. 
Justice White's argument is that the state Supreme 
Court provides independent review of the jury's sentencing 
decision, therefore any error by the jury will be washed out 
on appeal. If it were true that the Supreme Court really 
undertook an independent, de novo review of the sentence--such 
that the jury's sentence was in the nature of a 
recommendation--this argument would have some force to it. 
But as I understand it, the review by the Supreme Court is 
fairly perfunctory and is more in the nature of a quality 
control. The Supreme Court will not impose death where the 
-
- - 13. 
jury has not found for it. Thus, the initial decision by the 
jury to impose death is a necessary predicate to any death 
sentence. Moreover, the Court only makes sure that the 
sentence is consistent with other cases and that the 
aggravating circumstances are supported by the evidence. This 
review is something less than an independent evaluation. In 
short, I do not think we can rest on state supreme court 
review as curing any possible error in the jury's 
deliberations. See Red Brief at 28 n.31. 
Second, although the amicus argument wins high 
points for cleverness, I do not think that the description of 
- the aggravating circumstance inquiry, as merely acting as a 
threshold requirement, is credible. See Red Brief at 50. The 
Georgia statute requires the jury to state which aggravating 
circumstances it has found. The jury instructions direct the 
jury to consider the statutory aggravating circumstances in 
-
reaching its conclusion on sentencing. And we have 
consistently described the aggravating circumstances as 
providing guidance to the jury in sentencing. Thus, I do not 
think we can say that the jury was uninfluenced by its finding 
of an invalid aggravating circumstance. In reality, and on 
the facts of this case, it is probable that the jury was not 
influenced very much and would have reached the same result. 
But we 
In 
~ or sure. 
v. Oklahoma,) 447 U.S. 343 (1980), the Court 
over turned a tha- in part on an invalid 
-
- - 14. 
habitual offender statute. The habitual offender statute 
was invalidated by the Oklahoma state court subsequent to the 
jury's sentence. Even so the Oklahoma court refused to vacate 
Hicks' sentence, finding that he had not been prejudiced 
"since his sentence was within the range of punishment that 
could have been imposed in any event" and even if the jury had 
not relied upon the invalid provision. 
The Court reversed. The Court argued that more was 
at issue than a state procedural right: "Where . • . a State 
has provided for the imposition of criminal punishment in the 
discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say that 
- the defendant's interest in the exercise of that discretion is 
-
merely a matter of state procedural law. The defendant in 
such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that 
he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent 
determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory 
discretion ••• and that liberty interest is one that the 
Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation 
by the State." The State could not deprive Hicks of the jury 
sentence to which he was entitled "simply on the frail 
conjecture that a jury might have imposed a sentence equally 
as harsh as that mandated by the invalid habitual offender 
provision." Id. at 346. Further, the Hicks Court rejected 
the argument that review of the sentence by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court had cured any error: "The argument is 
unpersuasive. The State concedes that the petitioner had a 
-
- - 15. 
statutory right to have a jury fix his punishment in the first 
instance, and this is the right that was denied. Moreover, it 
is a right that substantially affects the punishment imposed. 
[I]t appears that the right to have a jury fix the 
sentence in the first instance is determinative, at least as a 
practical matter of the maximum sentence that a defendant will 
receive." Although Hicks can undoubtedly be distinguished, 
the thrust of the opinion seems directly applicable to our 
case. As a matter of due process alone I think that the CA5 
can be affirmed. I am not sure that any Eighth Amendment 
argument needs to be made. Indeed, I am not at all sure that 
- in the circumstances of this case there was any Eighth 
Amendment violation. But the due process argument suffices. 
-
- -
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To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
-
Re: Zant v. Stephens, No. 81-89 
-
I was somewhat shaken by oral argument, though I 
still stick by my ultimate conclusion that the sentence must be set 
aside as a matter of due process. I had one further thought on the 
interrelationship of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments, 








in Gregg and 
the jury's 
decisionmaking. The basic premise of these decisions is that the 
jury will be affected by the instructions and by the requirement 
that they focus on the statutory aggravating circumstances. This 
sets up the Due Process argument: Because we cannot be sure that 
the jury was not influenced by its finding of an invalid aggravating 
circumstance, and because our premise is that the jury is influenced 
by the aggravating circumstances it finds, the sentence is tainted 










do not think 
2. 
requires that the 
that due process 
necessarily requires re-sentencing. If, on remand, the Georgia 
Supreme Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would 
have sentenced Stephens to death anyway then I do not think that re-
sentencing would be necessary. Surely, on such a remand the Georgia 
court will find the error here to be harmless. If the holding were 
based on the eighth amendment then I suppose the matter would have 
to be returned to the jury for re-sentencing. The beneift of a due 
process holding is that re-sentencing by a jury might be avoided. 
The only hitch in this would be if for reasons of state law the 
Georgia court cannot find the jury's error to be harmless but must 
send it back to the jury. 
" .. 
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From: Justice Stevens 
C. 1 d ... ~ 2 '8? ircu ate : _______ _ 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-89 
WARREN ZANT, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. ALPHA 
OTIS O'DANIEL STEPHENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1982) 
PER CURIAM. 
The petitioner was convicted of murder in a Georgia Supe-
rior Court. His sentencing jury found the following statu-
tory aggravating circumstances: · 
"(l) that the offense of murder was committed by a per-
son with a prior record of conviction of a capital felony, 
Code Ann. § 27-2534.l(b)(l); (2) that the murder was 
committed by a person who has a substantial history of 
serious assaultive criminal convictions, Code Ann. 
§ 27-2534. l(b)(l), supra; and, (3) that the offense of mur-
der was committed by a person who had escaped from 
the lawful custody of a peace officer or a place of lawful 
confinement, Code Ann. §27-2534.l(b)(9)." Stephens v. 
Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, -, 247 S. E. 2d 92, -, cert. 
denied, 439 U. S. 991 (1978). 
The jury imposed the death penalty. On direct appeal, the 
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Stephens v. State, 237 
Ga. 259, 227 S. E. 2d 261 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 986 
(1977). On the authority of Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 
S. E. 2d 386 (1976), it set aside the second statutory ag-
gravating circumstance found by the jury. It upheld the 
death sentence, however, on the ground that in Arnold "that 
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whereas in the case under review "the evidence supports the 
jury's findings of the other statutory aggravating circum-
stances, and consequently the sentence is not impaired." 
237 Ga., at-, 227 S. E. 2d, at 263. 
After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Steph-
ens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S. E. 2d 92, cert. denied, 439 
U. S. 991 (1978), the respondent applied for a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal district court. Relief was denied by that 
court, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit "reverse[d] the district court's denial of habeas corpus 
relief insofar as it le[ft] standing the [respondent's] death 
sentence, and ... remanded for further proceedings." 631 
F. 2d 397, 407 (CA5 1980), modified, 648 F. 2d 446 (1981). 
We granted the State's petition for certiorari. -- U. S. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), we upheld the 
Georgia death penalty statute because the standards and pro-
cedures set forth therein promised to alleviate to a significant 
degree the concern of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 
(1972), that the death penalty not be imposed capriciously or 
in a freakish manner. We recogi:iized that the constitutional-
ity of Georgia death sentences ultimately would depend on 
the Georgia Supreme Court construing the statute and re-
viewing capital sentences consistently with this concern. 
See 428 U. S., at 198, 201-206 (Opinion of Stewart, POWELL, 
and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 211-212, 222-224 (WHITE, J., con-
curring in judgment). Our review of the statute did not lead 
us to examine all of its nuances. It was only after the state 
law relating to capital sentencing was clarified in concrete 
cases that we confronted and addressed more specific con-
stitutional challenges in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 
(1977), Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 14 (1978), Green v. 
Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
u. s. 420 (1980). 
Today, we are asked to decide whether a reviewing court 
constitutionally may sustain a death sentence as long as at 
-
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least one of a plurality of statutory aggravating circum-
stances found by the jury is valid and supported by the evi-
dence. The Georgia Supreme Court consistently has as-
serted that authority. 1 Its construction of state law is clear: 
"Where two or more statutory aggravating circumstances 
are found by the jury, the failure of one circumstance does 
not so taint the proceedings as to invalidate the other ag-
gravating circumstance found and the sentence of death 
based thereon." Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, --, 261 S. E. 
2d 349, 358 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 938 (1980). 
Despite the clarity of the state rule we are asked to review, 
there is considerable uncertainty about the state-law 
premises of that rule. 2 The Georgia Supreme Court has 
1 See Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698, --, 278 S. E. 2d 398, 407, cert.' 
denied, 449 U. S. 891 (1981); Green v. State, 246 Ga. 598, - , 272 S. E. 2d 
475, 485 (1980), cert. denied, - U. S. - (1981); Hamilton v. State, 
246 Ga. 264, - , 271 S. E . 2d 173, 174 n. 1 (1980); Brooks v. State, 246 Ga. 
262, -, 271 S. E. 2d 172, 172 (1980); Collins v. State, 246 Ga. 261, -, 
271 S. E . 2d 352, 354 (1980); Dampier v. State, 245 Ga. 882, - , 268 S. E. 
2d 349, 350 n. 1 (1980); Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458, - , 265 S. E. 2d 796, 
799--800, cert. denied, 446 U. S. 988 (1980); Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 
-, 261 S. E. 2d 349, 358 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U. S. 938 (1980); Steph-
ens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, --, 227 S. E. 2d 261, 263 (1976), cert. denied, 
429 u. s. 986 (1977). 
2 Last Term, Members of this Court expressed different assumptions 
about the meaning-and the constitutionality--0f the Georgia Supreme 
Court's position. In Drake v. Zant , 449 U. S. 999 (1980), the Court de-
clined to grant certiorari and vacate the judgments in two Georgia cases in 
which the death sentences-premised in part on the (b)(7) aggravating cir-
cumstance-were imposed prior to our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
u. s. 420 (1980). JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the disposition, ex-
pressed the opinion that the Georgia Supreme Court's position was so clear 
that there was no need to remand the cases for reconsideration in light of 
Godfrey. Id. , at 1000. Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice 
Stewart stated that if one aggravating circumstance found by the jury 
"could not constitutionally justify the death sentence, Georgia law would 
prohibit a further finding that the error was harmless simply because of the 
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never explained the rationale for its position. We do not 
know, for example, whether implicit in the rule is a deter-
mination that multiple findings of statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances are superfluous, or a determination that the re-
viewing court may assume the role of the jury when the 
sentencing jury acted under legally erroneous instructions. 
It would be premature to decide whether such determina-
tions, or any of the others we might conceive as a basis for 
the Georgia Supreme Court's position, might undermine the 
confidence we expressed in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, that the 
Georgia capital-sentencing system, as we understood it then, 
would avoid the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the 
death penalty and would operate in a fundamentally fair man-
ner. Suffice it to say that the state-law premises of the 
Georgia Supreme Court's conclusion of state law are relevant 
to the constitutional issue at hand. 
The Georgia Supreme Court under certain circumstances 
will decide questions of state law upon certification from this 
Court. See Georgia Code Ann. § 24-4536. 3 We invoke that 
lieved that the Georgia Supreme Court's position on the issue was incon-
sistent with the Georgia capital punishment scheme because "only the trial 
judge or jury can know and determine what to do when upon appellate re-
view it has been concluded that a particular aggravating circumstance 
should not have been considered in sentencing the defendant to death." 
Ibid. JUSTICE WHITE, also dissenting, would have remanded for re-
consideration in light of Godfrey, a disposition that "would allow the Geor-
gia Supreme Court in the first instance to determine whether the death 
penalty should be sustained without regard to the validity of the Godfrey 
circumstance." Id., at 1002. He did "not understand the Georgia cases 
... to hold either that the Georgia Supreme Court is without power to set 
aside a death penalty if it sustains only one of the aggravating circum-
stances found by the jury or that, although the court has that power, it 
invariably will not disturb the death penalty in such situations." Ibid. 
3 "When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States ... 
that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or proposi-
tions of the laws of this State which are determinative of said cause and 
there are no clear controlling precedents in the appellate court decisions of 
-
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statute to certify the following question: What are the 
premises of state law that support the conclusion that the 
death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of 
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the 
jury? 
The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit this certifi-
cate, signed by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and under the official 
seal of the Court, as well as the briefs and record filed with 
the Court, to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and simulta-
neously to transmit copies of the certificate to the attorneys 
for the respective parties. 
this State, such Federal appellate court may certify such questions or prop-
ositions of the laws of Georgia to this court for instructions concerning such 
questions or propositions." Georgia Code Ann. § 24-4536(a). 
- -~upuuu (!Jo-url n-f ilti-~ult ~hrlt,s-
~ as-frmg-Ltn. ]3. QJ. ZOffeJl.;} 
C H AMBE RS OF 
J USTICE JOHN PAUL S T EV ENS 
April 2, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 81-89 - Zant v. Stephens 
Although my conference notes are somewhat fuzzy, 
it is my understanding that there was a substantial 
consensus in favor of adopting Byron's suggestion to 
certify an appropriate question to the Georgia 
Supreme Court. The attached draft per curiam is an 
attempt to carry out that understanding. 
Although I will join a disposition along the 
lines set forth in the attached per curiam--and 
surely will consider any reformulation of the 
question that seems preferable--! am frankly somewhat 
skeptical about the value that will be derived from 
this disposition. At least this draft may provide a 





- -~u:prt llU' <!Ja-url o-f tlrt~f.th ~htlt»' 
~a.s-J:i-ittgfon. ~- <!J. 2!lffeJ!, 
CHA M BERS OF 
JUST ICE J O H N PAUL STEVE NS 
j~ 
April 2, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 81-89 - Zant v. Stephens 
Although my conference notes are somewhat fuzzy, 
it is my u nd e rstanding that there was a substantial 
cons e nsus in favor of adopting Byron's suggestion to 
certify an appropriate question to the Georgia 
Supreme Court. The attached draft per curiam is an 
attempt to carry out that understanding. 
Al t hough I will join a disposition along the 
lines set forth in the attached per curiam--and 
surely will consider any reformulation of the 
question that see ms preferable--I am frankly somewhat 
skeptical about the value t hat will be derived from 
this disposition. At l e ast this draft may provide a 
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/ ~ustice Rehnquist 
Justice Stevens 
Justice O' Connor 
Fr om: Justice Mar shall 
APR 5 1982 Circulated: _____ __ _ 
Recirculated: _____ ~_ 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
Six years ago in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) 
(joint opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), this Court 
declared: 
"Juries are invariably given careful 
instructions on the law and how to apply it 
before they are authorized to decide the 
merits of a lawsuit. It would be virtually 
unthinkable to fol l ow any other course i n a 
legal system t t has traditionally operated 
by following rior precedents and fixed rules 
of law. •.• en erroneous instructions are 
given, retrial is often required. It ts 
qu i te simply a hallmark of our legal system 
that iuries be carefully and adequately 
guided in their deliberations." (citations 
and footnote omited). 
In today's decision, a majority of this Court intimates that 
- 2 -
a post hoc construction of a death penalty statute by the State's 
highest court may remedy the fact that a jury was improperly 
instructed with respect to the very factors that save the Georgia 
statute from unconstitutionality. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra. 
Because I cannot see how the Georgia Supreme Court's response to 
this Court's certification could constitutionally justify the 
imposition of the death penalty in this case, I must dissent. 
I 
I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all 
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 
231. Even if I believed that the death penalty could 
constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, however, 
I believe that respondent Stephens' sentence must be vacated and 
his case remanded to the Georgia state cour.ts for resentencing 
before a properly instructed ~urv. 
II 
In my opinion, remanding this case for resentencing is 
compelled by this Court's decisions upholding the 
constitutionality of the Georgia death penalty statute, and by 
well recognized principles of appellate review. Therefore, 
whether or not the Georgia Supreme Court's construction of the 
statute in response to this Court's certification might avoid the 
constitutional infirmity inherent in respondent's sentence in 
some future case, it can do nothing to alter the fact that 
3 - -
respondent's death sentence may have been based in part on 
consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance. 
II 
Under Georgia law, certification is appropriate "[w]hen it 
shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States ••• that 
there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or 
propositions of the laws of this State which are determinative of 
said cause and there are no clear controlling precedents in the 
appellate court decisions of this State." Ga. Code §24-4536{a) 
{emphasis added). The majority attempts to bring this within the 
ambit of this certification procedure by indicating that "[w]e do 
not know ••• whether ••• multiple findings of statutory 
aggravating circumstances are superflous, or fwhether] •.. the 
reviewing court may assume the role of the iurv when the 
sentencing jury acted under legally erroneous instructions." 
Ante, at 4. The majority then requests the Georgia Supreme Court 
to clarify "the premises of state law that support the conclusion 
that the death sentence in this case is not impaired by the 
invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances 
found by the jury." Ante, at 5. 
I wholeheartedly agree that we do not know the answers to 
these questions. The majority recognizes that we do not possess 
this information because "rt]he Georgia Supreme Court has never 
explained the rationale for its position" that a death sentence 
may be reaffirmed when one of the aggravating circumstances 
relied on by the jury is declared invalid. Ante, at 3-4. I 
. --
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submit, however, that we are not alone in our ignorance. ~here 
is absolutely no indication that the jury sentencing respondent 
to death or the judge who instructed that jury was any more aware 
of the answers to these questions than we are today. Indeed, by 
certifying these questions to the Georgia Supreme Court, the 
majority concedes that it was impossible for anyone to know the 
answers to these questions at the time respondent was sentenced 
to death, because "there are no controlling precendents" in 
Georgia on these issues. Given this Court's prior treatment of 
cases in which a defendant received a sentence, particularly 
death sentence, on the basis of erroneous jury instructions, I do 
not understand how the Georgia Supreme Court's answer to the 
certified question could possibly be "determinative" of this 
case. 
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. (1972) this Court struck down 
death penalties imposed pursuant to a Georgia statute. Shortly 
thereafter, the Georgia legislature enacted the current death 
penalty statute. This statute provides for a separate sentencing 
proceeding after the defendant has been found guilty of a capital 
offense. During the sentencing phase, the trial judge 
shallinstruct the jury1 to consider "anv of the flO] statutory 
aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the 
evidence." Ga. Code ~27-2534.l{b). The aggravating 
circumstances found by the judge to be warranted by the evidence 
1 In bench trials, the judge must consider these factors. 
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are submitted to the jury in writing to be used dur i ng its 
de l iberations. Id., ~27-2534.l(c). If the iurv recommends a 
death sentence, it "shall designate in writing ••• the 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id., ~27-2534.l(c). Even if it finds that 
one or more aggravating circumstances has been established beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the jury is not required to impose the death 
penalty. See Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492, 246 S.E.2d 322 (1978). 
The jury's verdict to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. 
Miller v. State, 237 Ga. 557, 229 S.E.2d 376 (1976). ~he trial 
judge is bound by the jury's recommendation of sentence, whether 
that recommendation be life or death. Ga. Code ~~26-3102, 27-
2514. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, this Court held that this 
statutory scheme satisfied the constitutional guaranty against 
cruel and unusual punishment. In reac~ing this conclusion, the 
two principal joint opinions relied heavily on the fact that the 
aggravating circumstances served to guide the iury's discretion. 
Announcing the judgment of the Court, JUSTICE STEWART emphasized 
that because "the members of a jury will have had little, if any, 
previous experience in sentencing," id., at 192, they should be 
given specific standards to guide their sentencing deliberations, 
such as those provided in the Model Penal Code, which catalogs 
"'the main circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that 
should be weighed and weighed against each other'" by the jury. 
Id., at 193 (quoting ALI, Model Penal Code ~201.6, Comment 3, p. 
71 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)) (emphasis in original). JUSTICE 
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STEWART found that the new Georgia statute satisfied this 
requirement because, through the statutory aggravating 
circumstances, "[t]he new Georgia sentencing procedures .•• focus 
the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime 
and the particularized characteristics of the individual 
defendant. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S., at 206 (Opinion of 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). JUSTICE WHITE, ioined by THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment 
placed an even stronger emphasis on the role of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances: 
"The Georgia Legislature has plainly made an 
effort to guide the jury in the exercise of 
its discretion, while at the same time 
permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the 
basis of factors too intangible to write into 
a statute •••. As the types of murders for 
which the death penalty may be imposed become 
more narrowly defined and are limited to 
those which are particularly serious or for 
which the death penalty is peculiarly 
appropriate as they are in Georgia by reason 
of the aggravating-circumstance requirement, 
it becomes reasonable to expect that juries--
even given discretion not to impose the death 
penalty--will impose the death penalty in a 
substantial portion of the cases so defined." 
Id., at 222 (WHITE, J., concurring in the 
Judgment) (emphasis added). 
In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality 
opinion of STEWART, BLACKMON, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), this 
Court reaffirmed the role of aggravating circumstances in 
protecting against the arbitrary impostition of the death 
penalty. the GodfreyCourt addressed the constitutionality of a 
death sentence imposed in reliance on aggravating circumstance 
§(b) (7), which allows a jury to impose the death sentence if it 
finds that the murder "was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
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horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of 
mind, or an aggravated batterv to the victim." Ga. Code ~27-
2534 .1 (b) (7) • 
The plurality opinion found: "There is nothing in these few 
words standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the 
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. A 
person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost 
every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and 
inhuman. "' 446 U.S. , at 4 28-29. Sect ion (b) (7) , if construed 
broadly enough to encompass every murder, would be 
unconstitutional because it provides "no principled way to 
distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, 
from the many cases in which it was not." Id., at 433. The 
plurality found it significant that this interpretation of 
§(b) (7) "may ••. have been one to which the members of the iury 
in this case subscribed," and that, if the iury did hold this 
view their preconceptions were not dispelled by the tria l iudge's 
sentencing instructions." Id., at 429. Therefore, the iury was 
not given appropriate guidance, and the death sentence cou]d not 
constitutionally be imposed. 
In my view, this reasoning requires that respondent's death 
sentence be vacated and that this case be remanded so he can 
beresentenced by a properly instructed jury. It is conceded that 
the jury in this case was instructed on an aggravating 
circumstance that the Georgia Supreme Court has since declared 
unconstitutional. If this were the only aggravating circumstance 
found by the jury, it is also undisputed that the State would be 
- 8 -
unable to impose the death sentence, see Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 
534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976), even if the Georgia Supreme Court 
determined that the evidence supported a finding of other 
statutory aggravating circumstances. Cf. Presnell v. Georgia, 
439 U.S. 14, 16 (1978). Petitioner argues, however, because the 
jury found two other statutory aggravating circumstances that the 
Georgia Supreme Court found to be supported by the evidence, that 
court could reaffirm the death sentence. This argument flies in 
the face of the reasoning of the Godfrev plurality which found it 
crucial that the iury's decision to impoe the death sentence be 
guided by clear and appropriate instructions. 
Moreover, this argument is patently contrary to the settled 
principle that "if the jury has been instructed to consider 
several grounds for conviction, one of which proves to be 
unconstitutional, and the reviewing court is thereafter unable to 
determine from the record whether the jury relied on the 
unconstitutional ground, the verdict must be set aside." 
Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397, 406 (CA5 1980); see Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Since 1931, this Court has 
consistently declined to speculate about whether a particular 
jury would have reached the same conclusion in the absence of an 
unconstitutional instruction. See, e.g., Id., at367-368 (1931). 
Accord Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 570-571 (1970); 
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 585-588 (1969); Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1957). In light of this Court's 
consistent recognition that "the penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment," 
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Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (opinionn of 
STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); see, e.g., Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, U.S. ___ , --- (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), 
there is certainly no reason to engage in such speculation here. 
Yet, the jury is not required to recommend death even if lt finds 
that one or more aggravating circumstances has been established 
beyond a resonable doubt. Therefore, to adopt the bald 
pronouncement that "fw]here two or more statutory aggravating 
circumstances are found by the jury, the failure of one 
circumstance does not so taint the proceedings as to invalidate 
the other aggravating circumstance found and the sentence of 
death thereon," Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 599, 261 S.E.2d 349, 
358 (1979), we would have to speculate that the jury's decision 
to impose the death penalty was not influenced by the presence of 
the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance. 2 
Recognizing that settled law normally requires that 
sentences arguably imposed on the basis of unconstitutional 
instructions cannot stand, petitioner and several states in an 
amicus curiae brief 3 attempt to distinguish the Stromberg line of 
2To date, the majority of state courts that have 
confronted this issue have declined to speculate whether the jury 
would still have returned a death sentence in the absence of the 
subsequently invalidated aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., 
Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 686, 687-688 (Ark. 1981); State v. 
Irwin, 282 S.E.2d 439, 448-449 (N.C. 1981); State v. Moore, 614 
S.W.2d 348, 351-352 (Tenn. 1981); Hopkins v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 
171-172 (Wy. 1981}. See also Cook v. State, 369 So.2d 1251, 
1255-1257 (Ala. App. 1979} 
3The States of Alabama, California, Florida, Missouri, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Utah submitted an amicus 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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cases by arguing that, as a matter of statutory construction, a 
jury's finding that one of the ten aggravating circumstances has 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt is irrelevant to its 
ultimate conclusion that the death penalty should be imposed. 
Specifically, petitioner argues that the term "aggravating 
circumstance" actually has two entirely different meanings, with 
each meaning representing a separate task that a capital 
sentencing jury must perform. First, the jury must determine 
whether any of the ten statutory "aggravating circumstances" has 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt. This, petitioner 
argues, is a threshold determination only allows the iury to 
consider the death penalty, but has no impact on whether that 
penalty should be imposed. After reaching this threshold 
determination, the jury may consider anv "evidence in 
aggravation" or mitigation in reaching its conclusion as to 
whether the dealth penalty should be imposed. According to 
petitioner, the jury perfoms this second task free of any 
influence from the very "legislative guidelines" that, by 
"focus[ing] the jury's attention on the particularized nature of 
the crime and the particularized characteristics of the 
individual defendant," prevent the death penalty from being 
wantonly and freakishly imposed. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 
U.S., at 206-207 (plurality opinion of STEWART, POWELL, and 
brief on behalf of petitioner. It is interesting to note that 
the appellate courts of Alabama and North Carolina have already 
implicitly rejected the construction now urged by these States as 
amicus. Seen. 2, supra. 
11 - -
STEVENS, JJ.). 
Putting to one side both the plausibility and the 
constitutionality of petitioner's construction of the Georgia 
death penalty statute, 4 it is patently obvious that this ex post 
facto attempt to avoid the clear mandate of Stromberg cannot 
possibly remedy the constitutional infirmity of respondent's 
sentence. By certifying this question to the Georgia Supreme 
Court, the majority concedes that this construction has never 
been explicitly adopted by the Georgia courts. It must also be 
acknowledged that petitioner's interpretation of the jury's role 
under the Georgia law is not the only, or even the most 
plausible, construction of the death penalty statute. A person 
of ordinary sensibility and intelligence could fairly conclude 
that as a juror, he or she was required to place special emphasis 
on the existance of statutory aggravating circumstances, and 
weigh them against each other and against any mitigating 
circumstances, when deciding whether or not to impose the death 
penalty. Cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, at 428-429. Certainly 
several members of this Court have operated under this 
assumption. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S., at 197-198, 
221-222; Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, at 436-437 (MARSHALL, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Drake v. Zant, 449 U.S. 999, 1001 
(1980) (STEWART, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 




if the Georgia Supreme Court adopted this 
their death penalty statute, it would raise 
as to the constitutionality of this statute 
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If respondent's jury subscriben to this interpretation of 
their role, "their preconceptions were not dispelled by the trial 
judge's sentencing instructions." Id., at 429. Indeed, 
everything about the judge's charge highlighted the importance of 
the aggravating circumstances. Not only were the circumstances 
submitted to the jury in writing, but the jury was in turn 
required to write down each and every aggravating circumstance 
that it found to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Ga. Code §27-2534.l(c) discussed supra at The jury 
instructions provide absolutely no indication that, after 
carefully considering each of the stautory aggravating 
circumstances submitted by the tria l judge, the jury should, or 
even could, discard this list of officially sanctioned grounds 
for imposing the death penalty in deciding whether to actually 
sentence respondent to death. 
Absent even a shred of evidence that respondent's trial 
judge and jury were cognizant of petitioner's · asserted 
construction of the Georgia death penalty statute, a construction 
never acknowledged by any Georgia appellate court, we can only 
speculate whether "the verdict in this case was not decisively 
affected by an unconstitutional statutory aggravating 
circumstance." Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d, at 406. It is 
precisely to guard against such speculation that this Court has 
uniformly refused to uphold a conviction or sentence that might 
have been based even in part on an unconstitutional ground. 5 See 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
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supra, at Furthermore, in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 189, 
this Court made clear that "where discretion is afforded a 
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of 
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion 
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk 
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." See also Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 208. Because nothing the Supreme Court of 
Georgia can say in response to this Court's certification will 
assure us that respondent's jury was "suitably directed," 6 I must 
dissent. 
5It is irrelevant whether the jury's determination was 
only partially based on the presence of the unconstitutional 
aggravating circumstance. As this Court held in Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), "even assuming that the record 
precludes the inference that appellant's conviction might have 
been based solely on fan unconstitutional ground], we are still 
bound to reverse if the conviction could have been based upon 
both" an unconstitutional and a constitutional ground. Id., at 
~(emphasis in original). -
6The majority's implication that certifying this case give 
the Georgia Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify whether it 
has the power to "assume the role of the jury when the sentencing 
jury acted under legally erroneous instructions," ante, at 4, 
does not alter my conclusion. In affirming respondent's death 
sentence, the Georgia Supreme Court did not purport to exercise 
such authority. Nor did the State argue that such action was 
permissible in the proceedings before this Court. Indeed, prior 
to this Court's action today, it has always been assumed that the 
"only the trier of fact may impose a death sentence." Willis v. 
Balkcom, U.S. (1981) (MARSHALL, BRENNAN, and STEWART, 
JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). In any event, a 
"reviewing court can determine only whether a rational jury might 
have imposed the death penalty if it had been properly 
instructed: it is impossible for it to say whether a particular 
jury would have so exercised its discretion if it had known the 
law." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S., at 437 (MARSHALL, J., 






To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Zant v. Stephens, No. 81-89 
-
In my earlier memo I suggest language for a dissent 
that was wrong in one respect. This case is here on appeal 
from the CAS's granting of Stephens' habeas petition. Thus we 
cannot "vacate and remand." The dissent must affirm. Perhaps 
the following language is better. 
"I am in essential agreement with the views 
expressed by Justice Marshall in Part II of his dissenting 
opinion. I would not hold, however, that the case must be 
remanded for resentencing by a jury. The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit simply reversed and remanded thus leaving it 
to the Georgia Supreme Court to determine whether resentencing 
by a jury is required in this case. I would affirm that 
disposition." 
I should say as well that it simply does not seem to 
be Georgia law that the State Supreme Court can re-sentence on 
its own. Perhaps it may find harmless error, however. 
dfl 04/05/82 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
- -
Re: No. 81-89 Zant v. Stephens 
You were in dissent in this case. Justice Stevens 
has circulate a per curiam that certifies a question to the 
Georgia Supreme Court. 
persuasive dissent. 
Justice Marshall has circulated a 
I am not sure, however, that you should join Justice 
Marshall's dissent. He takes that position in footnote 6 and 
page 7 that the matter must be returned to a jury for 
resentencing. I think that your position has been that the 
State Supreme Court may resentence a defendant under the 
Eighth and Fifth Amendments--assuming that it has the power to 
do so under state law. Justice Marshall disagrees. He 
apparently believes that a jury must be provided and that any 
error in sentencing requires a remand to the jury. 
What you might do is circulate a brief dissent to 
the following: 
"I am in essential agreement with the views 
expressed by Justice Marshall in Part II of his dissenting 
opinion. I would not hold, however, that the case be remanded 




for resentencing, leaving it to the 




by a jury is 
This disposition permits the State Supreme Court either to 
resentence the defendant itself, or to hold that the ~Hx~xs error 
in the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I doubt that the Supreme Court of Georgia has the authority to do 
either of these things. But there is no point in foreclosing it. 
-
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'coNNOR 
No. 81-89 
De ar John, 
-
.§u:prtmt ~our! nf tlft 'lTnittb- §tdr.rr 
1lia5fyingtnn. p. ~. 2nsn3 
April 5, 198 2 
Zant v. Stephens 
I am in a gre ement with your p e r . c uriam in 
this case. 
. ., .. 
Justice Stevens 










JUSTICE POWELL, ~ dissenting. 
I am in essential agreement with the views 
expressed by Justice Marshall in Part II of his dissenting 
opinion, and with his conclusion that the death sentence was 
imposed under instructions that could have mislead the jury. 
I would not hold, however, that the case must be remanded 
for resentencing by a jury. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit simply 
reversed and remanded thus leaving it to the Georgia Supreme 
Court to determine whether resentencing by a jury is 
required in this case. It may be that under Georgia law the 
State Supreme Court lacks authority to resentence itself, 
rather than leave this role to a jury. If that should be 
the case, I would leave open -- also for the Supreme Court 
of Georgia to decide whether it has authority to find 
that the instruction was harmless error beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In ~um;Iwould leave the Supreme Court of Georgia 
full measure of flexibility under state law to 





the erroneous instruction at the sentencing stage. I add 
that it seems quite unnecessary to delay the final 
disposition of this case by certifying a question to the 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JusT1cE wM . J . BRENNAN, JR. April 6, 1982 
RE: No. 81-89 Zant v. Stephens 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
k 
Sincerely, 











From: Justice Stevens 
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Recirculated: _________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-89 
WALTER ZANT, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. ALPHA 
OTIS O'DANIEL STEPHENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[April - , 1983) 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is w.,wther respondent's death pen-
alty must be vacated because one of the three statutory ag-
gravating circumstances found by the jury was subsequently 
held to be invalid by the Supreme Court of Georgia, although 
the '(fther two aggravating circumstances were specifically 
upheld. The answer depends on the function of tiie}ury's 
finarng of an aggravating circumstance under Georgia's capi-
tal sentencing statute, and on the reasons that the aggravat-
ing circumstance at issue in this particular case was found to 
be invalid. 
In January 1975 a jury in Bleckley County, Georgia, con--victed respondent of the murder of Roy Asbell and sentenced 
him to death. The evidence received at the guilt phase of his 
trial, which included his confessions and the testimony of a 
number of witnesses, describeg. these events: On August 19, 
1974, while respondent was~ erv~ sentences for several 
burglary convictions and was also awaiting trial for escape, 
he again escaped from the Houston County jail. In the next 
two days he committed'iliree auto thefts, an'"'armed robbery, 
andv;everal burglaries. On August 21st, Roy Asbell inter-
rupted respondent and an accomplice in the course of bur-
glarizing the home of Asbell's son in Twiggs County. Re-
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accomplice, drove him in his own vehicle a short distance into 
Bleckley County. There they killed Asbell by shooting him 
twice through the ear at point blank range. 
At the sentencing phase of the trial the State relied on the 
evidence adduced at the guilt phase and also established that 
respondent's prior criminal record included convictions on 
two counts of armed robbery, five counts of burglary, and 
one count of murder. Respondent testified that he was 
"sorry" and knew he deserved to be punished, that his accom-
plice actually shot Asbell, and that they had both been 
"pretty high" on drugs. The Sta:,te requested the jury to im-
pose the death penalty and argued that the evidence estab-
lished the aggravating circumstances identified in sub-
paragraphs (b)(l), (b)(7), and (b)(9) of the Georgia capital 
sentencing statute. 1 
The trial judge instructed the jury that under the law of 
Georgia "every person found guilty of Murder shall be pun-
ished by death or by imprisonment for life, the sentence to be 
fixed by the jury trying the case." He explained that the 
1 Section 27-2534.l(b) of the Georgia Code provided, in part: 
"In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be author-
ized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the 
jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating cir-
cumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory 
aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence: 
"(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was 
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, 
or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. 
* * * 
"(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was 
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved tor-
ture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. 
* * * 
"(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has 
escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful 
confinement." 
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jury was authorized to consider all of the evidence received 
during the trial as well as all facts and circumstances pre-
_, 
sented in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation during the --; _ / ~ 
sentencing proceeding. He then stated: L- ~ 
"You may consider any of the following statutory ag-
gravating circumstances which you find are supported 
by the evidence. One, the offense of Murder was com-
mitted by a person with a prior record of conviction for a 
Capital felony, or the offense of Murder was committed 
{ by a person who has · a substantial history of serious as-
/. sa~ ns. ""Two, tn e offense of Mur-
der was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu- l,.. ~ 
man in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an J 
aggravated battery to the victim. Three, the offense of 
Murder was committed by a person who has escaped 
from the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of law-
ful confinement. These possible statutory circum-
stances are stated in writing and will be out with you 
during your deliberations on the sentencing phase of this 
case. They are in writing here, and I shall send this out 
with you. If the jury verdict on sentencing fixes pun-
ishment at death by electrocution you shall designate in 
writing, signed by the foreman, the aggravating circum-
stances or circumstance which you found to have been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless one or more 
of these statutory aggravating circumstances are proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt you will not be authorized to 
fix punishment at death." 2 
The jury followed the Court's instruction and imposed the 
death penalty. It designated in writing that it had found the 
aggravating circumstances described as "One" and "Three" in 
2 The instruction to the sentencing jury, App. 18-19, is quoted in full in 
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the judge's instruction. 3 It made no such finding with re-
spect to "Two". 4 It should be noted that the jury's finding 
under "One" encompassed both alternatives identified in the 
judge's instructions and in subsection (b)(l) of the statute-
that respondent had a prior conviction of a capital felony and 
that he had a substantial history of serious assaultive convic-
tions. These two alternatives and the finding that the mur-
der was committed by an escapee are de~cribed by the par-
ties as the three aggravating circumstances found by the 
jury, but they may also be viewed as two statutory aggravat- / 
ing circumstances, one of which rested on two grounds. 
In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia re-
spondent did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. 
Nor did he argue that there was any infirmity in the statu-
tory definition of those circumstances. While his appeal was 
pending, however, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Ar-
nold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 539-542, 224 S.E. 2d 386 (1976), 
that the aggravating circumstance described in the second I 
clause of (b)(l}-"a substantial history of serious assaultive ) 
criminal convictions"-was unconstitutionally vague. 5 Be-
cause such a finding had been m~de by tfiejufy in this case, 
3 The jury made the following special findings: 
"(1) The offense of Murder was committed by a person with a prior record 
of conviction for a capital felony. The offense of Murder was committed by 
a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convic-
tions. (2) The offense of Murder was committed by a person who has es-
caped from the lawful custody of a peace officer and place of lawful confine-
ment." App. 23. 
• Thus, this case does not implicate our holding in Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U. S. 420 (1980), that the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance as construed 
by the Georgia Supreme Court was unconstitutionally broad and vague. 
5 The defendant in Arnold had been sentenced to death by a jury which 
found no other aggravating circumstance. On appeal, he contended that 
the language of the clause "does not provide the sufficiently 'clear and ob-
jective standards' necessary to control the jury's discretion in imposing the 
death penalty. Coley v. State, [231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E. 2d 612 (1974)]; 
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the Georgia Supreme Court, on its own motion, considered 
whether it impaired respondent's death sentence. It con-r 
eluded that the two other aggravating circumstances ade-
quately supported the sentence. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 
259, 262, 227 S.E. 2d 261, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 986 (1976). 
The state court reaffirmed this conclusion in a subsequent ap-
peal from the denial of state habeas corpus relief. Stephens 
v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 603-604, 247 S.E. 2d 92, cert. denied, 
439 U. s. 991 (1978). 6 
After the Federal District Court had denied a petition for 
habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the C /I S" ~ 
Fifth Circuit considered two constitutional challenges to re-
spondent's death sentence. That court first rejected his con-
tention that the jury was not adequately instructed that it 
was permitted to impose life imprisonment rather than the 
death penalty even if it found an aggravating circumstance. 7 
The court then held, however, that the death penalty was 
invalid because one of the a avating circumstances found 
bythe jurLJ72 S late.r... he d un~ nstitut10na . 
The Court of Appeals gavetwo reasons for that conclusion. 
First, it read Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), 
as requiring that a jury verdict based on multiple grounds 
agreed that the statutory language was too vague and nonspecific to be ap-
plied evenhandedly by a jury. 236 Ga., at 540-542. 
6 In his state habeas petition, respondent unsuccessfully challenged the 
aggravating circumstance that he had a prior conviction for a capital fel-
ony. He was admittedly under such a conviction at the time of his trial in 
this case, but not at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court of Geor-
gia interpreted the statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2534. l(b)(l), as referring 
to the defendant's record at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, respond-
ent's contention was rejected. 241 Ga., at 602-603, 247 S.E. 2d 92, 96--97. 
Respondent renewed his challenge to that aggravating circumstance in his 
federal habeas petition, but the Court of Appeals correctly recognized that 
it had no authority to question the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation 
of state law. 631 F. 2d, at 405. The contention is not renewed here. 
7 631 F. 2d, at 404-405. This aspect of the Court of Appeals' decision is 
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must be set aside if the reviewing court cannot ascertain 
whether the jury relied on an unconstitutional ground. The 
court concluded: 
"It is impossible for a reviewing court to determine 
satisfactorily that the verdict in this case was not deci-
sively affected by an unconstitutional statutory ag-
gravating circumstance. The jury had the authority to 
return a life sentence even if it found statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances. It is possible that even if the jurors 
believed that the other aggravating circumstances were 
established, they would not have recommended the 
death penalty but for the decision that the offense was 
committed by one having a substantial history of serious 
assaultive criminal convictions, an invalid ground." 
Second, it believed that the presence of the invalid circum-
stance "made it possible for the jury to consider several prior 
convictions of [respondent] which otherwise would not have 
been before it." 631 F. 2d 397, 405-406 (CA5 1980). 
In al)etition for rehearing, the State pointed out that the 
evidence of respondent's prior convictions would have been 
admissible at the sentencing hearing even if it had not relied 
on the invalid circumstance. 8 The Court of Appeals then 
modified its opinion by deleting its reference to the possibil-
ity that the jury had relied on inadmissible evidence. It 
maintained, however, that the reference in the instructions 
to the invalid circumstance "may have unduly directed the ju-
ry's attention to his prior convictions." The court concluded, 
"It cannot be determined with the degree of certainty re-
quired in capital cases that the instruction did not make a 
critical difference in the jury's decision to impose the death 
penalty." 648 F. 2d 446 (CA5 1981). 
We granted Warden Zant' s petition for certiorari, 454 
U. S. 814 (1981). The briefs on the merits revealed that dif-
8 Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2503(a); 241 Ga., at 203--204; see pp. -- infra. 
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ferent state appellate courts have reached varying conclu-
sions concerning the significance of the invalidation of one of 
multiple aggravating circumstances considered by a jury in a 
capital case. 9 Although the Georgia Supreme Court had 
consistently stated that the failure of one aggravating cir-
cumstance does not invalidate a death sentence that is other-
wise adequately supported, 10 we concluded that an exposition 
of the state-law premises for that view would assist in fram-
ing the precise federal constitutional issues presented by the 
Court of Appeals' holding. We therefore sought @idance 
from the Georgia Supreme Court pursuant to Georgia's statu-
tory certification procedure. Ga. Code Ann. § 24-4536. 11 
· In its response to our certified question, the Georgia Su-
preme Court first distinguished Stromberg as a case in which 
the jury might have relied exclusively on a single invalid 
ground, noting that the jury in this case had expressly relied 
on valid and sufficient grounds for its verdict. The Court ( 
then explained the state-law premises for its treatment of ag-
gravating circumstances by analogizing the entire body of 
Georgia law governing homicides to a pyramid. It 
explained: 
"All cases of homicide of every category are contained 
within the pyramid. The consequences flowing to the 
perpetrator increase in severity as the cases proceed 
• Brief for Respondent 40-45; Brief of the States of Alabama, California, 
Florida, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah in Support of Pe-
titioner, Amici Curiae 13-15. 
10
-- U.S.--, --, n. 2 (1982); cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 
201, n. 53 (1976) (noting cases in which the Georgia Supreme Court had not 
explicitly relied on one of several aggravating circumstances when it up-
held the death sentence). 
11 We certified the following question: 
"What are the premises of state law that support the conclusion that the 
death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of one of the 
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from the base to the apex, with the death penalty apply-
ing only to those few cases which are contained in the 
space just beneath the apex. To reach that category a 
case must pass through three planes of division between 
the base and the apex. 
"The first plane of division above the base separates 
from all homicide cases those which fall into the category 
of murder. This plane is established by the legislature 
in statutes defining terms such as murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and justifiable 
homicide. In deciding whether a given case falls above 
or below this plane, the function of the trier of facts is 
limited to finding facts. The plane remains fixed unless 
moved by legislative act. 
"The second plane separates from all murder cases 
those in which the penalty of death is a possible punish-
ment. This plane is established by statutory definitions 
of aggravating circumstances. The function of the 
factfinder is again limited to making a determination of 
whether certain facts have been established. Except 
where there is treason or aircraft hijacking, a given case 
may not move above this second plane unless at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance exists. Code Ann. 
§ 27-2534.l(c). 
"The third plane separates, from all cases in which a 
penalty of death may be imposed, those cases in which it 
shall be imposed. There is an absolute discretion in the I 
factfinder to place any given case below the plane and 
not impose death. The plane i"tself is established by the 
factfinder. In establishing the plane, the factfinder con-
siders all evidence in extenuation, mitigation and ag-
gravation of punishment. Code Ann. § 27-2503 and 
§ 27-2534.1. There is a final limitation on the imposition 
of the death penalty resting in the automatic appeal pro-
cedure: This court determines whether the penalty of 
death was imposed under the influence of passion, preju-
-
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dice, or any other arbitrary factor; whether the statu-
tory aggravating circumstances are supported by the ev-
idence; and whether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. 
Code Ann. § 27-2537. Performance of this function may 
cause this court to remove a case from the death penalty 
category but can never have the opposite result. 
"The purpose of the statutory aggravating circum-
stances is to limit to a large degree, but not completely, 
the factfinder's discretion. Unless at least one of the 
ten statutory aggravating circumstances exists, the 
death penalty may not be imposed in any event. If 
there exists at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance, the death penalty may be imposed but the 
factfinder has a discretion to decline to do so without giv-
ing any reason. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 369, 283 
S.E. 2d 238 (1981); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 334, 240 
S.E. 2d 833 (1977); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 
S.E. 2d 37 (1977). In making the decision as to the pen-
alty, the factfinder takes into consideration all circum-
stances before it from both the guilt-innocence and the 
sentence phases of the trial. These circumstances re-
late both to the offense and the defendant. 
"A case may not pass the second plane into that area in 
which the death penalty is authorized unless at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance is found. However, 
this plane is passed regardless of the number of statu-
tory aggravating circumstances found, so long as there is 
at least one. Once beyond this plane, the case enters 
the area of the factfinder's discretion, in which all the 
facts and circumstances of the case determine, in terms 
of our metaphor, whether or not the case passes the 
third plane and into the area in which the death penalty 
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The Georgia Supreme Court then explained why the failure ' 
of the second groundof the (b)(l) statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance did not invalidate respondent's death sentence. 
It first noted that t:.:h.:....e ....;e,...v-=-id::...e:.::.n::..:c-2-e~o;..c;f;-.cr;....e.c;.s-'-;"'~ prior convic-
ti~ s had - ~eep Erop~ y received anj could properl): have 
been cons1a~y thej ury. The court expressed the opin-
ion that the mere fact that such evidence was improperly des-
ignated "statutory" had an "inconsequential impact" on the 
jury's death penalty decision. ~ urt noted that a 
different result might be reached if the failed circumstance 
had been supported by evidence not otherwise admissible or 
if there was reason to believe that, because of the failure, the 
sentence was imposed under the influence of an arbitrary fac-
tor. Id., 297 S.E. 2d, at 4. 
We are indebted to the Georgia Su reme Court for its 
help res on e o our certi_fied question. hat response 
makes it clear that we must confront hree separate issues in 
order to decide this case. First, does the Iim1teclpurpose 
served by the finding of a statutory aggravating circum-
stance in Georgia allow the jury a measure of discretion that 
is forbidden by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), and 
subsequent cases? Second, has the rule of Strom berg v. 
California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), been violated? Third, in 
this case, even though respondent's prior criminal record was 
properly admitted, does the possibility that the reference to 
the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance in the judge's 
instruction affected the jury's deliberations require that the 
death sentence be set aside? We discuss these issues in 
turn. 
I 
In many States the statutory aggravating circumstance 
plays a more significant function fo t he s entencmg process 
tnan in G'eor"gia. Tur example, in at least seventeen States, --not only must at least one aggravatmg circumstance be found 
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death sentence; in addition, the law requires the judge or 
jury to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the miti-
gating circumstances when it decides whether or not the 
death penalty should be imposed. 12 In Georgia, however, 
the ·ury is n t instructed to give any special wei ht to y 
a~ nce, to consi er mu tip e aggravating 
circumstances any more significant than a single such circum-
stance, or to balance aggravating against mitigating circum-
stances pursuant to any special standard. Thus, in Georgia, 
unlike a large number of other States, the finding of an~ g-
gravatin circums ance oes not p ay any role m idin the 
sentencing body in the exercise o its iscret10n, apart from 
its funct10nof narrowing the class of persons convicted of 
murder who are eligible for the death penalty. For this rea-
son, respondent argues that Georgia's statutory scheme is 
jnvalid under the holding in ~an v. Georgia. 
A fair statement of the consensus expressed by the Court 
in Furman is "that where discretion is afforded a sentencing 
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a 
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be 
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of 
12 Ala. Code §§ 13A--5-46(e), 13A-5-47(e); see Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 
1251, 1255--1257 (Ala. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1302(1); see Williams v. 
State, 621 S.W. 2d 686, 687 (Ark. 1981); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.1 
(West); Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2); Idaho Code § 1~2515(d); see State v. Os-
born, 631 P. 2d 187, 198-199 (Idaho 1981); Ind. Code § 35--50-2-9(e); Md. 
Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413(h); Miss. Code Ann. § 9~1~101(2)-(3); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §565.012; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 175.554, 200.033; N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 15A-2000(b); see State v. Irwin, 282 S.E. 2d 439, 448-449 (NC 1981); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2.B; Okla Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11; see Jones v. 
State, 648 P. 2d 1251, 1260 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 9711; Tenn. Code Ann. § 3~2-203(g); see State v. Moore, 614 S. W. 
2d 348, 351-352 (Tenn. 1981); State v. Wood, 648 P. 2d 71, 83-85 (Utah 
1981) (judicial gloss on statutory language); Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-102(d)(i); see 
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P. 2d 79, 90, n. 1, 171-172 (Wyo. 1981). These 
statutes differ in the degree of discretion given to the sentencer, judge or 
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wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and 
STEVENS, JJ.). After thus summarizing the central man-
date of Furman, the plurality opinion in Gregg set forth a 
general exposition of sentencing procedures that would sat-
isfy the concerns of Furman, id., at 189-195. But it ex-
pressly stated, ''We do not intend to suggest that only the 
above-described procedures would be permissible under 
Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along 
these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of 
Furman, for each distinct system must be examined on an 
individual basis." / d., at 195. The opinion then turned to 
specific consideration of the constitutionality of Georgia's 
capital sentencing procedures. Id., at 196-207. 
Geor ·a's scheme includes two im ortant features which 
the plura 1 y descn e in its general 1scuss10n o sentencing 
procedures that would guide and channel the exercise of dis-
cretion. Georgia has a bifurcated procedure, see id., at 
190-191, and its statute also mandates meaningful appellate 
review of every death sentence, see 'iif:"; at 195. -rrhe statute 
does not,1i"o~ follow the Model Penal Code's recommen-
dation that the jury's discretion in weighing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances against each other should be gov-
erned by specific standards. See id., at 193. Instead, as 
the Georgia Supreme Court has unambiguously advised us, 
the aggravating circumstance merel erforms the function 
of narrOWI,!1[ e s.,a egory o persons convic e of l_lllrder 
wlioare e · 'ble for die death penalty. 
"espondent argues t a e mandate of Furman is vio-
lated by a scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled 
discretion in determining whether the death penalty should 
be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member 
of the class made eligible for that penalty by statute. But 
that argument could not be accepted without overruling our 
specific holding in Gregg. For the Court approved Georgia's 
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nel the jury's discretion by enunciating specific standards to 
guide the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. 13 
The plurality's approval of Georgia's capital sentencing 
procedure rested primarily on two features of the scheme: 
that the jury was required to find at least one valid statutory 
aggravating circumstance and to identify it in writing, and 
that the state supreme court reviewed the record of every 
death penalty proceeding to determine whether the sentence 
was arbitrary or disproportionate. These elements, the 
opinion concluded, adequately protected against the wanton 
and freakish imposition of the death penalty. 14 This conclu-
13 The plurality specifically described the Georgia scheme in these terms: 
"Georgia did act, however, to narrow the class of murderers subject to 
capital punishment by specifying 10 statutory aggravating circumstances, 
one of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt 
before a death sentence can ever be imposed. In addition, the jury is au-
thorized to consider any other appropriate aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances. § 27-2534. l(b) (Supp. 1975). The jury is not required to find 
any mitigating circumstance in order to make a recommendation of mercy 
that is binding on the trial court, see § 27-2302 (Supp. 1975), but it must 
find a statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence 
of death." 428 U. S., at 196-197; see also id., at 161, 165, 206-207. Cf. 
id., at 208, 218, 222 (opinion of WHITE, J. , concurring in the judgment). 
The plurality opinion issued the same day in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 
262 (1976), makes clear that specific standards for balancing aggravating 
against mitigating circumstances are not constitutionally required. In 
Jurek we held that the State's action in "narrowing the categories of mur-
ders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed" served much the 
same purpose as the lists of statutory aggravating circumstances that 
Georgia and Florida had adopted. Id., at 270. We also held that one of 
the three questions presented to the sentencing jury permitted the defend-
ant to bring mitigating circumstances to the jury's attention. Id., at 
273-274. Thus, in Texas, aggravating and mitigating circumstances were 
not considered at the same stage of the criminal prosecution and certainly 
were not explicitly balanced against each other. 
14 "While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating 
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sion rested, of course, on the fundamental requirement that 
each statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy a con-
stitutional standard derived from the principles of Furman 
itself. For a system "could have standards so vague that 
they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision 
patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary 
and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in I 
Furman could occur." 428 U. S., at 195, n. 46. To avoid 
this constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must 
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the aeath 
pena y an must reasona6 y just1 t e 1mposit10n o a more 
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found 
guilty of murder. 15 
factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury's dis-
cretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose 
the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines. 
In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords 
additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in 
Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure 
applied here." 428 U. S., at 206-207. 
15 These standards for statutory aggravating circumstances address the 
concerns voiced by several of the opinions in Furman v. Georgia, supra. 
See 408 U. S., at 248, n. 11 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 294 (BREN-
NAN, J., concurring) ("it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals 
or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punish-
ment"); id., at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("of all the people con-
victed of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible 
as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful 
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed"); id., at 313 
(WHITE, J., concurring) ("there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing 
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is 
not"). 
In Gregg, the plurality again recognized the need for legislative criteria 
to limit the death penalty to certain crimes: "(T]he decision that capital 
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expres-
sion of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so griev-
ous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the 
penalty of death." 428 U. S., at 184. The opinion also noted with ap-
- -
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In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980), Justice Stew-
art's opinion for the plurality applied this analysis. In that 
case we concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court had given 
the aggravating circumstance described in subsection (b)(7) a 
construction that was unconstitutionally vague and open-
ended. We set aside petitioner's death penalty, which 
rested exclusively on a (b)(7) finding. The plurality ex-
plained that, if a State wishes to authorize capital punish-
ment, it has a constitutional responsibility to define the 
crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that ob-
viates standardless sentencing discretion. "It must channel I 
the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' 
that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make 
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of 
death."' Id., at 428. In Godfrey, however, we found that 
the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance as construed by the 
Georgia Supreme Court did not create any "inherent re-
straint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death 
sentence," because a person of ordinary sensibility could find 
that almost every murder fit the stated criteria. Id., at 
428-429. 16 Moreover, the facts of the case itself did not dis-
proval the efforts of legislatures to "define those crimes and those criminals 
for which capital punishment is most probably an effective deterrent." 
Id., at 186. The concurring opinion of JUSTICE WHITE in Gregg asserted 
that, over time, as the aggravating circumstance requirement was applied, 
"the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed [ would] 
become more narrowly defined and [would be] limited to those which are 
particularly serious or for which the death penalty is particularly appropri-
ate." 428 U. S., at 222. Cf. Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 
633, 636 (1977) (the State may consider as an aggravating circumstance the 
fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular du-
ties, because there is "a special interest in affording protection to those 
public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the 
safety of other persons and property.") 
16 It is clear that the invalidity of the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance did 
not rest on the inadmissibility of the underlying evidence. Evidence con-
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tinguish the murder from any other murder. We concluded 
that there was "no principled way to distinguish this case, in 
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in 
which it was not." Id., at 433. 
This Court's conclusion in Godfrey was analogous to the 
Georgia Supreme Court's holding in Arnold v. State that the 
second clause of the (b)(l) aggravating circumstance, which is 
at issue in this case, was "too vague and nonspecific to be ap-
plied evenhandedly by a jury." 236 Ga., at 541. The de-
fendant in that case, who had two prior convictions, had been 
sentenced to death by the jury solely on a finding that he had 
a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convic-
tions." The court concluded that the words "substantial his-
tory'' were so highly subjective as to be unconstitutional. 
Id., at 542; see n. 5 supra. That aggravating circumstance 
did not provide a principled basis for distinguishing Arnold's 
case from the many other murder cases in which the death 
penalty was not imposed under the statute. 
Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the 
stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty. But the Constitution 
does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravat-
ing factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, 
those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. 17 
sentencing stage without being resubmitted. Gregg, 428 U. S., at 164. 
11 See Gregg, supra, at 164, 196--197, 260; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 
242, 256--257, n. 14 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.). Similarly, the Model Penal Code draft discussed in Gregg, supra, at 
192-195, sets forth lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances but 
also provides that the sentencer "shall take into account . . . any other 
facts that it deems relevant . .. " ALI Model Penal Code § 210.06 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962). 
A State is, of course, free to decide as a matter of state law to limit the 
evidence of aggravating factors that the prosecution may offer at the sen-
tencing hearing. A number of States do not permit the sentencer to con-
-
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What is important at the selection stage is an individualized 
determination on the basis of the character of the individual 
and the circumstances of the crime. See Eddings v. Okla-
homa, 455 U. S. · 104, 110-112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U. S. 586, 601-605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts (Harry) 
v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633, 636-637 (1977); Gregg, supra, at 
197 (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S., at 
251-252 (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U. S. 280, 303-304 (1976) (plurality opinion). 18 
The Georgia scheme provides for categorical narrowing at 
the definition stage, and for individualized determination and 
appellate review at the selection stage. We therefore re-
main convinced, as we were in 1976, that the structure of the 
statute is constitutional. Moreover, the narrowing function 
has been properly achieved in this case by the two valid ag-
gravating circumstances upheld by the Georgia Supreme 
Court-that respondent had escaped from lawful confine-
ment, and that he had a prior record of conviction for a capi-
tal felony. These two findings adequately differentiate this 
case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational 
way from the many Georgia murder cases in which the death 
penalty may not be imposed. Moreover, the Georgia Su-
preme Court in this case reviewed the death sentence to de-
termine whether it was arbitrary, excessive, or dispropor-
tionate. 19 Thus the absence of legislative or court-imposed 
sider aggravating circumstances other than those enumerated in the stat-
ute. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1, 101-119 
(1980); see, e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1301(4); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9711(a)(2). 
18 See Gillers, supra n. 17, at 26-27. 
19 The Georgia Supreme Court conducts an independent review of the 
propriety of the sentence even when the defendant has not specifically 
raised objections at trial. See Stephens v. State, 237 Ga., at 260. In this 
case, the Georgia Supreme Court explained: 
"In performing the sentence comparison required by Code Ann. 
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standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of 
either or both of those aggravating circumstances does not 
render the Georgia capital sentencing statute invalid as ap-
plied in this case. 
II 
Petitioner contends that under the rule of t,Stromberg v. 
California, and subsequent cases, the invalidity of one of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances underlying the jury's 
sentencing verdict requires that its entire death sentence be 
set aside. In order to evaluate this contention, it is neces-
sary to identify two related but different rules that have their 
source in the Stromberg case. 
In Stromberg, a member of the Communist Party was con-
victed of displaying a red flag in violation of the California Pe-
nal Code. The California statute prohibited such a display 
(1) as a "sign, symbol or emblem" of opposition to organized 
government; (2) as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic ac-
tion; or (3) as an aid to seditious propaganda. This Court 
held that the first clause of the statute was repugnant to the 
federal Constitution and found it unnecessary to pass on the 
validity of the other two clauses because the jury's guilty ver-
dict might have rested exclusively on a conclusion that 
Stromberg had violated the first. The Court explained: 
"The verdict against the appellant was a general one. 
It did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As 
there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and 
the jury were instructed that their verdict might be 
given with respect to any one of them, independently 
considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of 
cases in which death was imposed, but similar cases in which death was not 
imposed." Id., at 262. 
As an appendix to the opinion it provided a list of the similar cases it had 
considered, as the statute requires. Id., at 263. See also Ross v. State, 
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the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of 
these clauses, which the state court has held to be sepa-
rable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this 
record that the appellant was not convicted under that 
clause." 283 U. S., at 367-368. 
* * * 
"The first clause of the statute being invalid upon its 
face, the conviction of the appellant, which so far as the 
record discloses may have rested upon that clause exclu-
sively, must be set aside." Id., at 369-370. 
One rule derived from the Stromberg case requires that a 
general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed 
that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, 
and one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict 
may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground. The 
cases in which this rule has been applied all involved general 
verdicts based on a record that left the reviewing court un-
certain as to the actual ground on which the jury's decision 
rested. See, e. g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 
287, 292 (1942); Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 36 n. 
45 (1945); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1949); 
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 311-312 (1957). This 
rule does not require that respondent's death sentence be 
vacated, because the jury did not merely return a general 
verdict stating that it had found at least one aggravating cir-
cumstance. The jury expressly found aggravating circum-
stances that were valid and legally sufficient to support the 
death penalty. 
The second rule derived from the Stromberg case is illus-
trated by Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 528--529 (1945), 
and Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 586-590 (1969). In 
those cases we made clear that the reasoning of Stromberg 
encompasses a situation in which the general verdict on a sin-
gle-count indictment or information rested on both a constitu-
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lins, a labor organizer's contempt citation was predicated 
both upon a speech expressing a general invitation to a group 
of nonunion workers, which the Court held to be constitution-
ally protected speech, and upon solicitation of a single indi-
vidual. The Court declined to consider the State's conten-
tion that the judgment could be sustained on the basis of the 
individual solicitation alone. 20 For the record showed that 
the penalty had been imposed on account of both solicitations. 
"The judgment therefore must be affirmed as to both or as to 
neither." 323 U. S., at 529. Similarly, in Street, the record 
indicated that petitioner's conviction on a single-count in-
dictment could have been based on his protected words as 
well as on his arguably unprotected conduct, flag-burning. 
We stated that, "unless the record negates the possibility 
that the conviction was based on both alleged violations," the 
judgment could not be affirmed unless both were valid. 394 
U. S., at 588. 
The Court's opinion in Street explained: 
"We take the rationale of Thomas to be that when a 
single-count indictment or information charges the com-
mission of a crime by virtue of the defendant's having 
done both a constitutionally protected act and one which 
may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict ensues without 
elucidation, there is an unacceptable danger that the 
trier of fact will have regarded the two acts as 'inter-
twined' and have rested the conviction on both together. 
See 323 U. S., at 528--529, 540-541. Ibid. 
The rationale of Thomas and Street .applies to cases in 
which there is no uncertainty about the multiple grounds on 
which a general verdict rests. If, under the instructions to 
20 The State neither conceded nor unequivocally denied that the sentence 
was imposed on account of both acts. "Nevertheless the State maintains 
that the invitation to O'Sullivan in itself is sufficient to sustain the judg-
ment and sentence and that nothing more need be considered to support 
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the jury, one way of committing the offense is to perform an 
act protected by the Constitution, the rule of these cases re-
quires that a general verdict of guilt be set aside even if the 
defendant's unprotected conduct, considered separately, 
would support the verdict. But this second rule derived 
from Stromberg applies only in cases in which the State has 
based its prosecution, at least in part, on a charge that con-
stitutionally protected activity is unlawful. In a death sen-
tencing context, if the judge's instructions authorized a jury 
to treat constitutionally protected conduct as an aggravating 
circumstance supporting a sentence of death, a general ver-
dict resting in whole or in part on such a circumstance should 
also be set aside under the reasoning in Thomas and Street. 
In Stromberg, Thomas, and Street, the trial courts' judg-
ments rested, in part, on the fact that the defendant had been 
found guilty of expressive activity protected by the First 
Amendment. In contrast, in this case there is no suggestion 
that any of the aggravating circumstances involved any con-
duct protected by the First Amendment or by any other pro-
vision of the Constitution. A death sentence supported by 
at least one valid aggravating circumstance need not be set 
aside under the second Stromberg rulE'&~ggravat- .o __,, 
ing circumstance is "invalid" in the sense that 1t is insufficient 
by itself to support the death penalty. In this case, the ju-
ry's finding that respondent was a person who has a "sub-
stantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" did 
not provide a sufficient basis for imposing the death sen-
tence. But it raised none of the concerns underlying the 
holdings in Stromberg, Thomas, and Street, for it did not 
treat constitutionally protected conduct as an aggravating 
circumstance. 
III 
Two themes have been reiterated in our opinions discuss-
ing the procedures required by the Constitution in capital 
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ments in the Gregg plurality opinion indicated, 328 U. S., 
92-195, and as THE CHIEF JUSTICE explicitly noted in 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion), 
there can be "n~perl ct procedure for deciding in which 
cases government authority should be used to impose 
death." See als eek v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 638, n. 13 
(1980). On the other hand, because there is a qualitative dif-
ference between death and any other permissible form of 
punishment, "there is a corresponding difference in the need 
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropri-
ate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, supra, 428 U. S., at 305. "It is of vital importance to 
the defendant and to the community that any decision to im-
pose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on rea-
son rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 
supra, at 358. Thus, although the mere possibility that 
there was some imperfection in the deliberative process is 
not sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state court 
judgm'ent, the severity of the sentence mandates special 
scrutiny in the review of any claim of error. 
Respondent contends that the death sentence was im-
paired because the judge instructed the jury with regard to 
an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance, a "substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," for these 
instructions may have affected the jury's deliberations. In 
analyzing this contention it is essential to keep in mind the 
sense in which that aggravating circumstance is "invalid." 
It is not invalid because it authorizes a jury to draw adverse 
inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected. 
Georgia has not, for example, sought to characterize the dis-
play of a red flag, cf. Stromberg v. California, the expression 
of unpopular political views, cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 
U. S. 1 (1949) , or the request for trial by jury, cf. United 
States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 (1968), as an aggravating 
circumstance. Nor has Georgia attached the "aggravating" 
label to factors that are constitutionally imperrr1issible or to-
-
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tally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for exam-
ple the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant, 
cf. Herndon v. Georgia, 301 U. S. 242 (1937), or to conduct 
that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such 
as perhaps the defendant's mental illness. Cf. Miller v. 
Florida, 373 So. 2d 882, 885-886 (Fla. 1979). If the ag-
gravating circumstance at issue in this case had been invalid 
for reasons such as these, due process of law would require 
that the jury's decision to impose death be set aside. 
But the invalid aggravating circumstance found by the jury 
in this case was struck down in Arnold simply because it fails 
to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case 
in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases 
in which such a penalty may not be imposed. See p. 4, n. 5, 
and p. 16, supra. The underlying evidence is nevertheless 
fully admissible at the sentencing phase. As we noted in 
Gregg, supra, at 163, the Georgia statute provides that, at 
the sentencing hearing, the judge or jury 
"shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitiga-
tion, and aggravation of punishment, including the 
record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of 
guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or 
the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, 
however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the 
State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial 
shall be admissible." Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2503 (empha-
sis supplied). 21 
We expressly rejected petitioner's objection to the wide 
scope of evidence and argument allowed at presentence 
hearings. 
21 See Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 873 (1980) ("Any lawful evidence which 
tends to show the motive of the defendant, his lack of remorse, his general 
moral character, and his predisposition to commit other crimes is admissi-
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''We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not I 
to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that 
can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open and 
far-ranging argument. . . . So long as the evidence in-
troduced and the arguments made at the presentence 
hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not 
to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the 
jury to have as much information before it as possible 
when it makes the sentencing decision." 428 U. S., at 
203-204. See id., at 206-207; see also n. 17, supra. 
Thus any evidence on which the jury might have relied in 
this case to find that respondent had previously been con-
victed of a substantial number of serious assaultive offenses 
was properly adduced at the sentencing hearing. Nor, given 
the statutory proviso, did the instruction regarding the 
invalid aggravating circumstance allow the jury to consider 
potentially erroneous or misleading evidence that the defend-
ant did not have an adequate opportunity to explain. 22 Cf. 
Gardner v. Florida, supra; Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 
14, 16, n. 3 (1978). zi This case involves a statutory aggravat-
22 "The purpose of Code Ann. § 27-2503(a) is to allow a defendant to ex-
amine his record to determine if the convictions are in fact his, if he was 
represented by counsel, and any other defect which would render such doc-
uments inadmissible during the pre-sentencing phase of the trial." Her-
ring v. State, 238 Ga. 288, 290, 232 S.E. 2d 826 (1977). See Franklin v. 
State, 245 Ga. 141, 149-150 (1980). As we held in United States v. Tucker, 
404 U. S. 443, 447-449 (1972), even in a noncapital sentencing proceeding, 
the sentence must be set aside if the trial court relied at least in part on 
"misinformation of constitutional magnitude" such as prior uncounseled 
convictions that were unconstitutionally imposed. 
23 The State acknowledges that, if an invalid statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance were supported by material evidence not properly before the 
jury, a different case would be presented. Brief for the Petitioner 13, 
Supplemental Memorandum for Petitioner 18, Tr. of Or. Arg. 14, 18--20. 
We need not decide whether the death sentence would be impaired in 
other circumstances, for example, if the jury's findings included an ag-
gravating circumstance which the appellate court finds to be unsupported 
-
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ing circumstance, invalid on grounds of vagueness, whose 
terms plausibly described aspects of the defendant's back-
ground that were properly before the jury and whose accu-
racy was unchallenged. Hence the erroneous instruction 
does not implicate our repeated recognition that the "qualita-
tive difference between death and other penalties calls for a 
greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is im-
posed." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S., at 604 (opinion of BUR-
GER, C. J.). 
Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged on rehearing 
that the evidence was admissible, it expressed the concern 
that the trial court's instruct10ns "may have unduly directed 
the jury's attention to his prior conviction." But, assuming 
that the instruction did induce the jury to place greater em-
phasis upon the respondent's prior criminal record than it 
would otherwise have done, the question remains whether 
that emphasis violated any constitutional right. In answer-
ing this question, it is appropriate to compare the instruction 
that was actually given, see p. 3 supra, with an instruction on 
the same subject that would have been unobjectionable. Cf. 
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S'. 145, 154-157 (1977). Nothing 
in the United States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from 
instructing a jury that it would be appropriate to take ac-
count of a defendant's prior criminal record in making its sen-
tencing determination, see n. 17 supra, even though the de-
fendant's prior history of noncapital convictions ccmld not by 
itself provide sufficient justificatio.n_fo.r imposing the death 
sentence. There would have been no constitutional infirmity 
in a~ ing, in substa~ ond a 
by sufficient evidence, see, e. g., Williams v. State, supra, 621 S. W. 2d, at 
687 (absence of proper supporting proof of prior violent felony); State v. 
Moore, supra, 614 S.W. 2d, at 351 (same); State v. Irwin, supra, 282 S.E. 
2d, at 445-448 (evidence insufficient to support kidnapping as aggravating 
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reasonable doubt that the defendant is a person who has pre-
viously been convicted of a capital felony, or that he has es-
caped from lawful confinement, you will be authorized to im-
pose the death sentence, and in deciding whether or not that 
sentence is appropriate you may consider the remainder of 
his prior criminal record." 
'~~ 
The effect the erroneous instruction may have had on the 
jury is therefore merely a consequence of the statutory label 
"aggravating circumstance." That label arguably might 
have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to re-
spondent's prior criminal record than it otherwise would have 
given. But we do not think the Georgia Supreme Court 
erred in its conclusion that the "mere fact that some of the 
aggravating circumstances presented were improperly desig-
nated 'statutory"' had "an inconsequential impact on the ju-
ry's decision regarding the death penalty." The instruc-
tions, see p. 3 supra, did not place particular emphasis on the 
role of statutory aggravating circumstances in the jury's ulti-
mate decision. Instead the trial court instructed the jury to 
"consider all of the evidence received in court throughout the 
trial before you" and to "consider all facts and circumstances 
presented in extinuation [si c], mitigation and aggravation of 
punishment as well as such arguments as have been pre-
sented for the State and for the Defense." App. 18. More 
importantly, for the reasons discussed above, any possible 
impact cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in 
the sentencing process. 
Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of ) 
an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory aimellate 
review of each death sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court 
to avo1 arb1trarmess and to assure proportionality. 24 We 
accept that court's view that the subsequent invalidation of 
one of several statutory aggravating circumstances does not 
automatically require reversal of the death penalty, having 
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been assured that a death sentence will be set aside if the 
invalidation of an aggravating circumstance makes the pen-
alty arbitrary or capricious. 250 Ga., at 101, 297 S. E. 2d, at 
4. The Georgia Supreme Court, in its response to our certi-
fied question, expressly stated, "A different result might be 
reached in a case where evidence was submitted in support of 
a statutory aggravating circumstance which was not other-
wise admissible, and thereafter the circumstance failed." As 
we noted in Gregg, 428 U. S., at 204-205, we have also been 
assured that a death sentence will be vacated if it is excessive 
or substantially disproportionate to the penalties that have 
been imposed under similar circumstances. 
Finally, we note that in deciding this case we do not ex-
press any opinion concerning the possible significance of a 
holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is 
"invalid" under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury 
is specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether 
to impose the death penalty. Seen. 12 supra. As we have 
discussed, see pp. 10-18 supra, the Constitution does not re-
quire a State to adopt specific standards for instructing the 
jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, and Georgia has not adopted such a system. 
Under Georgia's sentencing scheme, and under the trial 
judge's instructions in this case, no suggestion is made that 
the presence of more than one aggravating circumstance 
should be given special weight. Whether or not the jury had 
concluded that respondent's prior record of criminal convic-
tions merited the label "substantial" or the label "assaultive," 
the jury was plainly entitled to consider that record, together 
with all of the other evidence before it, in making its sentenc-
ing determination. 
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ALPHA OTIS O'DANIEL STEPHENS 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I am in essential agreement with the views expressed by 
JUSTICE MARSHALL in Part II of his dissenting opinion, and 
with his conclusion that the death sentence was imposed 
under instructions that could have misled the jury. I would 
not hold, however, that the case must be remanded for re-
sentencing by a jury. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit simply reversed 
and remanded thus leaving it to the Georgia Supreme Court 
to determine whether resentencing by a jury is required in 
this case. It may be that under Georgia law the State Su-
preme Court lacks authority to resentence itself, rather than 
leave this role to a jury. If that should be the case, I would 
leave open-also for the Supreme Court of Georgia to de-
cide-whether it has authority to find that the instruction 
was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.;§u.prmtl' C!Jom-t of 14r 1trrili2t .;§taus-
~ru;!png-tan. 10. ~. 20,?)!.,;J 
April 29, 1982 
Re: No. 81 - 89 - Zant v. Stephens 
Dear John: 
I join your April 16 recirculation of the 
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Dear John : 
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April 29, 198 2 
Please join me in your~ curiam. I am frank to say 
that I share your skepticism expressed in the memorandum of 
April 2 . It certainly may prove of little value, and it may 
complicate the Georgia situation . But it will be well to 
find out . 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely , ,~ 
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Re: No. 81-89 - Zant v. Stephens 
Dear John: 
I am in general agreement with Byron's memo 
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April 15, 1982 
I would much prefer that in certifying this case to the 
Georgia Supreme Court, we expressly refer to the position of the 
Attorney General in this Court. Hence, I suggest that starting 
with the first sentence beginning on page 5 the rest of that 
paragraph be expanded into two paragraphs, somewhat along the 
following lines: 
It may be that implicit in the rule is a determination that 
multiple findings of statutory aggravating circumstances 
are superfluous, or a determination that the reviewing 
court may assume the role of the jury when the sentencing 
jury recommended the death penalty under legally erroneous 
instructions. In this Court, the Georgia Attorney General 
submits still another construction of state law: The jury 
must first determine whether one or more statutory 
aggravating circumstances have been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Finding the existence of one or more 
aggravating circumstances is a threshold determination 
which authorizes the jury to consider imposing the death 
penalty; it serves as a bridge which takes the jury from 
the general class of all murders to the narrower class of 
offenses the state legislature has determined warran t the 
death penalty. After making the determination that the 
death penalty is a possible punishment, the jury then make s 
a separate determination whether the death penalty should 
be imposed. It bases this determination "not upon the 
statutory aggravating circumstances but upon all the 
evidence before the jury in aggravation and mitigation of 
punishment which ha [s] been introduced at both phases of 
the trial." Brief for Petitioner 13. 
,, 
. "' .. - -
In these circumstances, it would be premature to 
decide whether such determinations, or any of the others we 
might conceive as a basis for the Georgia Supreme Court's 
position, might undermine the confidence we expressed in 
Gregg v. Georgia, supra, that the Georgia capital-
sentencing system, as we understood it then, would avoid 
the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty and would otherwise pass constitutional muster. 
Suffice it to say that the state-law premises of the 
Georgia Supreme Court's conclusion of state law are 
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15, 1982 
I would much prefer that in certifying this case to the 
Georgia Supreme Court, we expressly refer to the position of the 
Attorney General in this Court. Hence, I suggest that starting 
with the first sentence beginning on page 5 the rest of that 
paragraph be expanded into two paragraphs, somewhat along the 
following lines: 
It may be that implicit in the rule is a determination that 
multiple findings of statutory aggravating circumstances 
are superfluous, or a determination that the reviewing 
court may assume the role of the jury when the sentencing 
jury recommended the death penalty under legally erroneous 
instructions. In this Court, the Georgia Attorney General 
submits still another construction of state law: The jury 
must first determine whether one or more statutory 
aggravating circumstances have been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Finding the existence of one or more 
aggravating circumstances is a threshold determination 
which authorizes the jury to consider imposing the death 
penalty; it serves as a bridge which takes the jury from 
the general class of all murders to the narrower class of 
offenses the state legislature has determined warrant the 
death penalty. After making the determination that the 
death penalty is a possible punishment, the jury then makes 
a separate determination whether the aeath penalty should 
be imposed. It bases this determination "not upon the 
statutory aggravating circumstances but upon all the 
evidence before the jury in aggravation and mitigation of 
punishment which ha [s] been introduced at both phases of 
the trial." Brief for Petitioner 13. 
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In these circumstances, it would be premature to 
decide whether such determinations, or any of the others we 
might conceive as a basis for the Georgia Supreme Court's 
position, might undermine the confidence we expressed in 
Gregg v. Georgia, supra, that the Georgia capital-
sentencing system, as we understood it then, would avoid 
the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty and would otherwise pass constitutional muster. 
Suffice it to say that the state-law premises of the 
Georgia Supreme Court's conclusion of state law are 
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No. 81-89 
ZANI' (Warden) 
(pinion Received from Supreme Court 
of Georgia on Question Certified to 
that court on May 3, 1982 -
v. 
STEPHENS (criminal defendant) Ga. s.ct. (Gregory) 
~ 
SUMMARY: On May 3, 1982, this Court in a~ curiarn decision certified 
the following question to the Ga. s.ct.: 
What are the premises of state law that support the con-
clusion that the death penalty in this case is not 
impaired by the invalidity of one of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances found by the jury? 
The Ga. s.ct. has filed an opinion addressing that question. 
FACTS: Resp was found guilty of murder and the jury reconunended the 
death penalty after making the following findings: •(l) The offense of 
murder was coJlllTlitted by a person with a prior record of conviction for a 
capital felony. The offense of murder was colTIITlitted by a person who has a 
substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. (2) The 
offense of murder was colTIITlitted by a person who has escaped from
1
the lawful . 
custod~ of a peace officer and place of lawful confinement.• / 
I_, ~ct<4, C..F R.. ~ ~ f~~h .. TL,._ 
~~ ~~ ~ ~ -4~ ~ 
- - 2 - -
on appeal the Ga. s.ct., relying on an earlier decision,l indicated that 
the second circumstance_or factor of (1) was void but that the remaining . -z::... 
factors were supported by the evidence thus leaving the sentence unimpaired. 
Following unsuccessful attempts to obtain state habeas ·relief, the resp sought 
federal habeas relief. The DC denied his petn but the CA 5 (now CA 11) 
reversed and remanded citing strorrberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
✓ 
This Court granted cert and on May 3, 1982 indicated in a ..e:E_ curiarn that 
the Ga. s.ct. had never explained the rationale for its decisions that the 
failure of one aggravating circumstance does not taint the others. Because of 
uncertainties surrounding the rule, the Court ask the Ga. s.ct. to explain its 
rationale. 
GA. s.cr.'s OPINION: The court first stated that it did find Stromberg 
to be controlling. In that ca~e the jury returned a general verdict. Here 
the jury entered special findings on two of the ten aggravating factors 
allowed by statute. Ga. Code Ann. §27-2534.l(b)(l), (b)(9). The finding as 
to (b)(l) contains two grounds stated in the disjunctive (record of capital 
felony conviction(oi ) ubstantial history of serious assaultive criminal 
convictions). Each ground is sufficient to support the (b)(l) factor. 
~
The question of whether ~ n~ deration of an invalid ground taints the 
~~  ' 
jury's findings, can be answered by examining the entire body of Ga. law on 
~ -
homicide. In certain homicide cases, the death penalty is not available -because the legislature has specifically exempted some crimes; the fact 
finders determine if a particular type of homicide has been committed. If a 
finding of guilty is rendered as to a crime for which the death penalty is 
possible, the jury is required to consider whether any statutory aggravating 
factors are present. If at least one is found, the jury must~ onsid:5-
-
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all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented both on the merits 
... -- - - ------ ~----------- ........ --and during sentencing to determine -if the death penalty is appropriate. Even 
..-,, --~,,,,....____ ,,,........___~------- -= 4-r.... __, 
then, an appellate court may .set aside a death sentence if it was imµ:>sed 
under the influence of an arbitrary factor. 
Although the (b)(l) provision relating to resp's history of assaultive 
/ 
crimes was invalid, the evidence offered at trial to supµ:>rt that prong was 
otherwise admissible under Ga. law. §27-2503. The fact that some of the 
' . ~ . -aggravating evidence was designated as statutory had an inconsequential impact 
on this case. 
Further, the failure of one of a multiple of statutory aggravating 
circumstances did not lead to a sentence imµ:>sed under the influence of an 
arbitrary factor. 
DISCUSSION: The Ga. s.ct.'s reasoning seems to parallel that offered by 
the Ga. AG in his presentation to the Court, i.e., the finding of at least one ---------~ , --
aggravating circumstance is a threshold or bridge to further consideration of 
whether the death penalty should be irnp:>sed. '" 
rt would seem that the court has several options at this µ:>int. rt could 
call for responses from the parties, issue a follow-up opinion, dismiss as 
improvidently granted, or hold for No. 81-6908, Barclay v. Florida, which was 
granted on Nov. 8 and addresses a similar issue. 
I recorranend that the parties be invited to briefly respond to the Ga. 
s.ct.'s opinion. 
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ZANT (warden ~ .A1 J __ ~ -'- o ' . 
- 1 ~ ~ , A • Cr.,, / ~ ~ ~
v. ~ a-- _..A"~~~~J;y~ 
srEPHEN.S (cri_'j.'.'~1,.~~✓ •~"- ~  
SUMMJ\RY:~ May 3, l ~ ou'J;,;;z;;:;iam decision certifie~ 
the following questiJ to the Ga. s :i:t.: . > ~ C JI/ JI ~ 
~ ~..,~,J. - ~~~~ 1-o O ~6/--: 
What y.fe ~ : f state law tha~ rtille concllsion 
that~ /hin this case is not impaired by the 
invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances , 
found 1:/ ~he jury~ ~ ~ A-4,4'~ 41:,,_, t:::,,f-' ~~
The Ga. s.ct. f i- t question. By order of 
Nov. 15, 1982, the court invited the parties to file briefs expr~ sing their ------------------...---- -~ 
views regarding the Ga. S.Ct.'s answer to the certified question. Those 
briefs have now been filed. 
MEM:JRANDUM OF PETR/STATE OF GEDRGIA: The argument of the State of 
Georgia substantially tracks that expressed by the Ga. s.ct. in its response 
to the certified question, as addressed in Legal Office memo dated Nov. 10, 
1982. ,~~~ 
~~~ 
,V'J1 ~ ~r 
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MEMORANDUM OF RESP/STEPHENS: Resp advances three arguments: 
(1) The Ga. s.ct. has failed to articulate any state-law premises to 
justify its failure to apply Stromberg v. california, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
Rather, that court has attempted to explain as a matter of federal law why 
Stromberg and street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) are inapplicable. The 
Ga. s.ct. distinguishes Stromberg noting that the jury therein returned only a 
general finding as opposed to the •special finding" on three grounds in this 
case; and it dismisses street concluding that the jury in this case considered 
each ground on its own merit. However, contrary to the Ga. S.Ct. 's view, the 
"special findings" rendered by Stephens' jury can save the jury's verdict 
under street only if the two findings of valid statutory aggravating 
circumstances require the jury to impose the death sentence. They do not, 
since the jury may irrpose a life sentence even when it finds aggravating 
factors. Therefore reversal is required since the Stephens jury's written 
verdict expressly indicates that an unconstitutional factor played some part 
in its deliberation and decision. 
(2) The only state-law premises articulated by the Ga. S.Ct. pertain to 
why the Eighth Amendment principles did not require that Stephens' sentence be 
vacated. This contravenes Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). According to the Ga. S.Ct., the sole 
function of Ga. 's statutory aggravating circumstance is to •separate from all 
murder cases those in which the penalty of death is a possible punishment.• 
Under Gregg, the jury must be both apprised of the information relevant to the 
imposition of sentence and be provided with standards to guide its use of the 
information. Under the Ga. S.Ct.'s present interpretation, the latter is 
ignored. Not only is the jury free to ignore the legislative enumeration of 
aggravating circumstances, but the Ga. S.Ct. is free to ignore the fact that 
the jury relied upon an unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance 
,. 
• 
- - 3 - -
when it decided UfX)n a sentence of death. These Georgia procedures violate 
Furman's proscription against sentencing procedures which create a substantial 
risk that the punishment would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. 
(3) EVen if the Ga. sentencing scheme were to survive a Furman 
mallenge, Stephens' death sentence would have to be vacated since his jury 
was never instructed under the Ga. ct's newly announced "pyramid" sentencing 
standard. The jurors may have thought they were to consider all of the 
statutory aggravating factors before reaching a sentencing decision. Thus, it 
would be impossible for a reviewing court to know what role the 
unconstitutional statutory factor played in the decision. From this setting 
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To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: No. 81-89, Zant v. Stephens 
Resp was sentenced to death on the basis of three aggra--
vating circumstances. The Ga. S.Ct. set aside the second aggra-
vating circumstance on state law grounds, but affirmed the con-
viction on the basis of the first and third aggravating circum-
stances. 
V Your view was "that the death sentence was imposed under 
cA-p} instructions that could have misled the jury." Since the aggra-
~~ vating circumstances must guide the jury's discretion for the 
,,~- \ death penalty statute to be constitutional, e.g.,~ regg v. Geor-
• ~, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the jury must have relied on some or 
all of the aggravating circumstances when imposing sentence. 
Since we do not know which aggravating circumstances the jury 
considered adequate to justify the sentence, the case should be 
remanded for resentencing unless the Ga. S.Ct. may say "'beyond a -reasonable doubt that the [second aggravating circumstance] did 
not contribute to the verdict obtained,'" Connecticut v. Johnson, 
U.S. ___ , (POWELL, J., dissenting?) (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
I recommend that the case be set for oral argument, pos-
sibly in conjunction wit~ arclay v. Florida, No. 81-6908. This 
is an important issue which should be resolved with a full opin-
ion after proper consideration. 
~-P~~IJ~ 
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No. 81-89 , _~ant v. Stephens 
The Chief Justice ri; C r l ' , 
~ 
Justice Brennan 








Justice Marshall ~ ~ 




Justice Rehnquist f<w... 
w-<-~ ;t.o ~ # f'L s/~f-~ 
~~~~~ 
Justice Stevens ~ 
, I 
~ ~ ~ ~ /l~~~J!, a.- .t~~ 
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Justice O'Connor ~ 
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Apr.il 11, 1983 
81-89 Zant v. Stephens 
Dear John: 
Your thorough opinion is quite persuasi.ve, and I 
may well join it. 
In view, however, of what was written - including 
my separate opinion - when the case was here before, I will 
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~ 
WALTER ZANT, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. ALPHA 
OTIS O'DANIEL STEPHENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
• PPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT J1. 
JfrV -~ [April -, 1983] 
~ JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. a_ 
--- - The question presented is whether respondent's death pen-
~ ~ __,,,__ alty must be vacated because one of the three statutory ag-
/T ' ~ - avating circumstances found by the jury was subsequently 
/?~ eld to be invalid by the Supreme Court of Georgia, although 
---; , ~ . L--.~ the other two aggravating circumstances were specifically 
~--, upheld. The answer depends on the function of the jury's 
~ I finding of an aggravating circumstance under Georgia's capi-
11a!_. q ~ ~t 'c:..t- tal sentencing statute, and on the reasons that the aggravat-
J) ~ A n .,, ,I ./ ~ ing circumstance at issue in this particular case was found to 
~~ be invalid. 
,h.,,,/.,,,... In January 1975 a jury in Bleckley County, Georgia, con-
 v V victed respondent of the murder of Roy Asbell and sentenced 
..._ .. him to death. The evidence received at the guilt phase of his 
~~ al, which included his confessions and the testimony of a 
numb o ·tnesses, described these events: On August 19, 
~ .::::2.~~~~ Mt,~ w~hi~· il respondent was serving sentences for several 
A . /' _/ burglary convictions and was also awaiting trial for escape, 
l1A. ~, ,-- he again escaped from the Houston County jail. In the next_ 
,,.. ~- . ~ .IJ ~ two days he committed three auto thefts, an armed robbery, 
- An~ ~e-ye_rl}j burglaries. On August 21st, Roy Asbell inter-
~ pondent and an accomplice in the course of bur-
~~ glarizing the home of Asbell's son in Twiggs County. Re~ 
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accomplice, drove him in his own vehicle a short distance into 
Bleckley County. There they killed Asbell by shooting him 
twice through the ear at point blank range. 
At the sentencing phase of the trial the State relied on the 
evidence adduced at the guilt phase and also established that 
respondent's prior criminal record included convictions on 
two counts of armed robbery, five counts of burglary, and 
one count of murder. Respondent testified that he was 
"sorry'' and knew he deserved to be punished, that his accom-
plice actually shot Asbell, and that they had both been 
"pretty high" on drugs. The State requested the jury to im-
pose the death penalty and argued that the evidence estab-
lished the aggravating circumstances identified in sub-
paragraphs (b)(l), (b)(7), and (b)(9) of the Georgia capital 
sentencing statute. 1 
The trial judge instructed the jury that under _the law of 
Georgia "every person found guilty of Murder shall be pun-
ished by death or by imprisonment for life, the sentence to be 
fixed by the jury trying the case." He explained that the 
1 Section 27-2534.l(b) of the Georgia Code provided, in part: 
"In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be author-
ized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the 
jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating cir-
cumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory 
aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence: 
"(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was 
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, 
or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. 
* * * 
"(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was 
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved tor-
ture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. 
* * * 
"(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has 
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jury was authorized to consider all of the evidence received 
during the trial as well as all facts and circumstances pre-
sented in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation during the 
sentencing proceeding. He then stated: 
"You may consider any of the following statutory ag-
gravating circumstances which you find are supported 
by the evidence. One, the offense of Murder was com-
mitted by a person with a prior record of conviction for a 
Capital felony, or the offense of Murder was committed 
by a person who has a substantial history of serious as-
saultive criminal convictions. Two, the offense of Mur-
der was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an 
aggravated battery to the victim. Three, the offense of 
Murder was committed by a person who has escaped 
from the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of law-
ful confinement. These possible statutory circum-
stances are stated in writing and will be out with you 
during your deliberations on the sentencing phase of this 
case. They are in writing here, and I shall send this out 
with you. If the jury verdict on sentencing fixes pun-
ishment at death by electrocution you shall designate in 
writing, signed by the foreman, the aggravating circum-
stances or circumstance which you found to have been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless one or more 
of these statutory aggravating circumstances are proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt you will not be authorized to 
fix punishment at death." 2 
The jury followed the Court's instruction and imposed the 
death penalty. It designated in writing that it had found the 
aggravating circumstances described as "One" and "Three" in 
2 The instruction to the sentencing jury, App. 18--19, is quoted in full in 
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the judge's instruction. 3 It made no such finding with re-
spect to "Two". 4 It should be noted that the jury's finding 
under "One" encompassed both alternatives identified in the 
judge's instructions and in subsection (b)(l) of the statute--
that respondent had a prior conviction of a capital felony and 
that he had a substantial history of serious assaultive convic-
tions. These two alternatives and the finding that the mur-
der was committed by an escapee are described by the par-
ties a~ the three aggravating circumstances found by the 
jury, but they may also be viewed as two statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances, one of which rested on two grounds. 
In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia re-
spondent did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. 
Nor did he argue that there was any infirmity in the statu-
tory definition of those circumstances. While his appeal was 
pending, however, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Ar-
nold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 539-542, 224 S.E. 2d 386 (1976), 
that the aggravating circumstance described in the second 
clause of (b)(l)-"a substantial history of SE!rious assaultive 
criminal convictions"-was unconstitutionally vague. 5 Be-
cause such a finding had been made by the jury in this case, 
• The jury made the following special findings: 
"(1) The offense of Murder was committed by a person with a prior record 
of conviction for a capital felony. The offense of Murder was committed by 
a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convic-
tions. (2) The offense of Murder was committed by a person who has es-
caped from the lawful custody of a peace officer and place of lawful confine-
ment." App. 23. 
• Thus, this case does not implicate our holding in Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U. S. 420 (1980), that the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance as construed 
by the Georgia Supreme Court was unconstitutionally broad and vague. 
•The defendant in Arnold had been sentenced to death by a jury which 
found no other aggravating circumstance. On appeal, he contended that 
the language of the clause "does not provide the sufficiently 'clear and ob-
jective standards' necessary to control the jury's discretion in imposing the 
death penalty. Coley v. Srote, [231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E. 2d 612 (1974)]; 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1971)." The Georgia Supreme Court_ 
-
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5 
the Georgia Supreme Court, on its own motion, considered 
whether it impaired respondent's death sentence. It con-
cluded that the two other aggravating circumstances ade-
quately supported the sentence. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 
259, 262, 227 S.E. 2d 261, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 986 (1976). 
The state court reaffirmed this conclusion in a subsequent ap-
peal from the denial of state habeas corpus relief. Stephens 
v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 603-604, 247 S.E. 2d 92, cert. denied, 
439 u. s. 991 (1978). 6 
• 
~ -. .... 
After the Federal District Court had denied a petition for 
habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit considered two constitutional challenges to re-
spondent's death sentence. That court first rejected his con-
tention that the jury was not adequately instructed that it 
was permitted to impose life imprisonment rather than the 
death penalty even if it found an aggravating circumstance. 7 
The court then held, however, that the death penalty was / 
invalid ~ ne of the aggravating circumstances found 
by the jury was later held unconstitutional. 
~c~~ 
The Court of Appeals gave two reasons for that conclusion. 
First, it read Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), 
as requiring that a jury verdict based on multiple grounds 
agreed that the statutory language was too vague and nonspecific to be ap-
plied evenhandedly by a jury. 236 Ga., at 540-542. 
6 In his state habeas petition, respondent unsuccessfully challenged the 
aggravating circumstance that he had a prior conviction for a capital fel-
ony. He was admittedly under such a conviction at the time of his trial in 
this case, but not at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court of Geor-
gia interpreted the statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2534.l(b)( l ), as referring 
to the defendant's record at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, respond-
ent's contention was rejected. 241 Ga. , at 602-603, 247 S.E. 2d 92, 96-97. 
Respondent renewed his challenge to that aggravating circumstance in his 
federal habeas petition, but the Court of Appeals correctly recognized that 
it had no authority to question the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation 
of state law. 631 F. 2d, at 405. The contention is not renewed here. 
' 631 F. 2d, at 404-405. This aspect of the Court of Appeals' decision is 
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must be set aside if the reviewing court cannot ascertain 
whether the jury relied on an unconstitutional ground. The 
court concluded: 
"It is impossible for a reviewing court to determine 
satisfactorily that the verdict in this case was not deci-
sively affected by an unconstitutional statutory ag-
gravating circumstance. The jury had the authority to 
return a life sentence even if it found statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances. It is possible that even if the jurors 
believed that the other aggravating circumstances were 
established, they would not have recommended the 
death penalty but for the decision that the offense was 
committed by one having a substantial history of serious 
assaultive criminal convictions, an invalid ground." 
Second, it believed that the presence of the invalid circum-
stance "made it possible for the jury to consider several prior 
convictions of [respondent] which otherwise would not have 
been before it." 631 F. 2d 397, 405-406 (CA5 1980). 
In a petition for rehearing, the State Eointed O!!,.t that the 
evidence of res ondent's rior convictions would liavebeen 
admiss1 e at the sentencing earmg even a no relied 
on tfie invaifa circumsfance':Y The Court of Appeals then 
modified its opinion by deleting its reference e possibil-
ity that the jury had relied on inadmissible evidence. It 
maintained, however, that the reference in the instructions 
to the invalid circumstance "may have unduly directed the ju-
ry's attention to his prior convictions." The court concluded, 
"It cannot be determined with the degree of certainty re-
quired in capital cases that the instruction did not make a 
critical difference in the jury's decision to impose the death 
penalty." 648 F. 2d 446 (CA5 1981). 
We granted Warden Zant' s petition for certiorari, 454 
U. S. 814 (1981). The briefs on the merits revealed that dif-
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ferent state appellate courts have reached varying conclu-
sions concerning the significance of the invalidation of one of 
multiple aggravating circumstances considered by a jury in a 
capital case. 9 Although the Georgia Supreme Court had 
consistently stated that the failure of one aggravating cir-
cumstance does not invalidate a death sentence that is other-
wise adequately supported, 10 we concluded that an exposition 
of the state-law premises for that view would assist in fram-
ing the precise federal constitutional issues presented by the 
Court of Appeals' holding. We therefore sought guidance 
from the Georgia Supreme Court pursuant to Georgia's statu-
tory certification procedure. Ga. Code Ann. § 24-4536. 11 
In its response to our certified question, the Georgia Su-
preme Court1frstclisffifguisliecf "S"trom"IMrg as a case in which 
the jury might have relied exclusively on a single invalid 
ground, noting that the jury in this case had expressly relied 
on valid and sufficient grounds for its verdict. The Court 
then explained the state-law premises for its treatment of ag-
gravating circumstances by analogizing the entire body of 
Georgia law governing homicides to a pyramid. It 
explaine : 
"All cases of homicide of every category are contained 
within the pyramid. The consequences flowing to the 
perpetrator increase in severity as the cases proceed 
9 Brief for Respondent 40-45; Brief of the States of Alabama, California, 
Florida, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah in Support of Pe-
titioner, Amici Curiae 13-15. 
10
-- U. S.--, --, n. 2 (1982); cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 
201, n. 53 (1976) (noting cases in which the Georgia Supreme Court had not 
explicitly relied on one of several aggravating circumstances when it up-
held the death sentence). 
11 We certified the following question: 
''What are the premises of state law that support the conclusion that the 
death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of one of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury? " -- U. S. 
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from the base to the apex, with the death penalty apply-
ing only to those few cases which are contained in the 
space just beneath the apex. To reach that category a 
case must pass through three planes of division between 
the oas ~ L><A.l...._ .. p x. 
"The st pla of division above the base separates 
from all hormc1 e cases those which fall into the category 
of murder. This plane is established by the legislature 
in statutes defining terms such as murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and justifiable 
homicide. In deciding whether a given case falls above 
or below this plane, the function of the trier of facts is 
limited to finding facts. The plane remains fixed unless 
moved by le · slative act. 
"The cond plane eparates from all murder cases 
those in w penalty of death is a possible punish-
ment. This plane is established by statutory definitions 
of ·t!ir v~~~;ices. The function of the 
fact er is again "mite to making a determination of 
whether certain facts have been established. Except 
where there is treason or aircraft hijacking, a given case 
may not move above this second plane unless at least one 
statutory a gravating circumstan e exists. Code Ann. 
§27- . <~c'-=-· -
"The · d lane eparates, from all cases in which a 
penalty of death may be imposed, those cases in which it 
sh~ l be imEosed. There is an absolute discretion in the 
factliiiaer top lace any given case below the plane and 
not impose death. The plane itself is established by the 
factfinder. In establishing the plane, the factfinder con-
siders all evidence in extenuation, mitigation and ag-
gravation of punishment. Code Ann. § 27-2503 and 
§ 27..:..2534.1. There is a final limitation on the imposition 
of the death penalty resting in the automatic appeal pro-
cedure: This court determines whether the penalty of 
death was imposed under the influence of passion, preju-
, 
- :..-
/ I ~ 
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dice, or any other arbitrary factor; whether the statu-
tory aggravating circumstances are supported by the ev-
idence; and whether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. 
Code Ann. § 27-2537. Performance of this function may 
cause this court to remove a case from the death penalty 
category but can never have the opposite result. 
"The purpose of the statutory aggravating circum-
stances is to limit to a large degree, but not completely, 
the factfinder's discretion. Unless at least one of the 
ten statutory aggravating circumstances exists, the 
death penalty may not be imposed in any event. If 
there exists at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance, the death penalty may be imposed but the fact-
finder has a discretion to decline to do so without giving 
any reason. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 369, 283 S.E. 
2d 238 (1981); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 334, 240 S.E. 
2d 833 (1977); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S.E. 2d 
37 (1977). In making the decision as to the penalty, the 
factfinder takes into consideration all circumstances be-
fore it from both the guilt-innocence and the sentence 
phases of the trial. These circumstances relate both to 
the offense and the defendant. 
"A case may not pass the second plane into that area in 
which the death penalty is authorized unless at least one 
statutory aggravating circumstance is found. However, 
this plane is passed regardless of the number of statu-
tory aggravating circumstances found, so long as there is 
at least one. Once beyond this plane, the case enters 
the area of the factfinder's discretion, in which all the 
facts and circumstances of the case determine, in terms 
of our metaphor, whether or not the case passes the 
third plane and into the area in which the death penalty 
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The Georgia Supreme Court then explained why the failure 
of the second ground of the (b)(l) statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance did not invalidate respondent's death sentence. 
It first noted that the evidence of respondent's prior convic-
tions had been properly received and could properly have 
been considered by the jury. The court expressed the opin-
ion that the mere fact that such evidence was improperly des-
ignated "statutory'' had an "inconsequential impact" on the 
jury's death penalty decision. Finally, the court noted that a 
different result might be reached if the failed circumstance 
had been supported by evidence not otherwise admissible or 
if there was reason to believe that, because of the failure, the 
sentence was imposed under the influence of an arbitrary fac-
tor. Id., 297 S.E. 2d, at 4. 
We are inde~ ed to the Geor~ a Supreme Court for its 
helpful response t o our certified question. That response 
makes it clear that we must confront three separate issues in 
order to decide this case. First, does the limited purpose 
served by the finding of a statutory aggravating circum-
stance in Georgia allow the jury a measure of discretion that 
is forbidden by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), and 
subsequent cases? Second, has the rule of Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), been violated? Third, in 
this case, even though respondent's prior criminal record was 
properly admitted, does the possibility that the reference to 
the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance in the judge's 
instruction affected the jury's deliberations require that the 
death sentence be set aside? We discuss these issues in 
; 
I - >--
t~. l I O m ,',s ,o" 
In Georgia, unlike some other States, 12 the jury is not in-
structed to give any special weight to any aggravating cir-
12 See, e. g. , Williams v. State, 621 S. W. 2d 686, 687 (Ark. 1981); State v. I 
Irwin, 282 S.E. 2d 439, 448-449 (NC 1981); State v. Moore, 614 S.W. 2d 
348, 351-352 (Tenn. 1981); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P. 2d 79, 90, n. 1, 
-
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any more significant than a single such circumstance, ~ ~ 
cumstance, to consider multiple aggravating circumstances ~/-
balance aggravating against miti atin circumstances pursu- , k 
an to any s ec1a stan ard. Thus, in Georgia, e mg of 
an aggravatmg c1rcu stance does not play any role in guid-
ing the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart 
from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted 
of murder who are eligible for the death penalty. For this 
reason, respondent argues that Georgia's statutory scheme is 
invalid under the holding in Furman v. Georgia. 
A fair statement of the consensus expressed by the Court 
in Furman is "that where discretion is afforded a sentencing 
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a 
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be 
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of 
wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and 
STEVENS, JJ.). After thus summarizing the central man-
date of Furman, the plurality opinion in Gregg set forth a 
general exposition of sentencing procedures that would sat-
isfy the concerns of Furman, id., at 189-195. But it ex-
pressly stated, ''We do not intend to suggest that only the 
above-described procedures would be permissible under Fur-
man or that any sentencing system constructed along these 
general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Fur-
171-172 (Wyo. 1981). In each of these cases, the state supreme court set 
aside a death sentence based on both valid and invalid aggravating circum-
stances. Respondent advances thes_e cases in support of his contention 
that a similar result is required here. However, examination of the rele-
vant state statutes shows that in each of these States, not only must the 
jury find at least one aggravating circumstance in order to have the power 
to impose the death sentence; in addition, the law requires the jury to 
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances 
when it decides whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. See 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1302(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(b); Tenn. Code 
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man, for each distinct system must be examined on an indi-
vidual basis." Id., at 195. The opinion then turned to spe-
cific consideration of the constitutionality of Georgia's capital 
sentencing procedures. Id., at 19&-207. 
Geo · a's cheme includes two important features which 
the plurality describe m its genera iscussion o entencing 
procedures that would guide and channel the exercise of dis-
cretion. Georgia has a bifurcated procedure, see id., at 
190-191, and its statute also mandates meaningful appellate 
review of every death sentence, see id., at 195. The statute 
does not, however, follow the Model Penal Code's recommen-
dation that the jury's discretion in weighing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances against each other should be gov-
erned by specific standards. See id., at 193. Instead, as 
the Georgia Supreme Court has unambi ously advised us, 
the a avatmg circumstance mere y e orms e ction 
of narro~ ng t e ca~ gory of _J>ersons convicte o murder 
who are eligi"6Te for thedeatli" penalty. 
Respondent argues that the mandate of Furman is vio-
lated by a scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled 
discretion in determining whether the death penalty should 
be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member 
of the class made eligible for that penalty by statute. But 
that argument could not be accepted without overruling our 
specific holding in Gregg. For the Court approved Georgia's 
capital sentencing statute even though it clearly did not chan-
nel the jury's discretion by enunciating specific standards to 
guide the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. 13 
13 The plurality specifically described the Georgia scheme in these terms: 
"Georgia did act, however, to narrow the class of murderers subject to 
capital punishment by specifying 10 statutory aggravating circumstances, 
one of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt 
before a death sentence can ever be imposed. In addition, the jury is au-
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The plurality's approval of Georgia's capital sentencing 
procedure rested primarily on two features of the scheme: 
that the jury was required to find at least one valid statutory 
aggravating circumstance and to identify it in writing, and 
that the state supreme court reviewed the record of every 
death penalty proceeding to determine whether the sentence 
was arbitrary or disproportionate. These elements, the 
opinion concluded, adequately protected against the wanton 
and freakish imposition of the death penalty. 1• This conclu-
sion rested, of course, on the fundamental requirement that 
each statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy a con-
stitutional standard derived from the principles of Furman 
cumstances. § 27-2534. l(b) (Supp. 1975). The jury is not required to find 
any mitigating circumstance in order to make a recommendation of mercy 
that is binding on the trial court, see § 27-2302 (Supp. 1975), but it must 
find a st,a,tutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence· 
of death." 428 U. S., at 196-197; ·see also id., at 161, 165, 206-207. Cf. 
id. , at 208, 218, 222 (opinion of WmTE, J ., concurring in the judgment). 
The plurality opinion is&l}ed the same day in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 
262 (1976), makes clear that specific standards for balancihg aggravating 
against mitigating cir(!umstances are not constitutionally required. In 
Jurek we held that the State's action in "narrowing the categories of mur-
ders for which a dea(h sentence may ever be imposed" served much the 
same purpose as the lists of statutory aggravating circumstances that 
Georgia and Florida had adopted. Id., at 270. We also held that one of 
the three questions presented to the sentencing jury permitted the defend-
ant to bring mitigating circumstances to the jury's attention. Id., at 
273-274. Thus, in Texas, aggravating and mitigating circumstances were 
not considered at the same stage of the criminal prosecution and certainly 
were not explicitly balanced against each other. 
14 "While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating 
factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury's dis-
cretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose 
the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines. 
In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords 
additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in 
Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure 




ZANT v. STEPHENS 
-
itself. For a system "could have standards so vague that 
they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision 
patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary 
and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in 
Furman could occur." 428 U. S., at 195, n. 46. To avoid 
this constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must 
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more 
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found 
guilty of murder. 15 
15 These standards for statutory aggravating circumstances address the 
concerns voiced by several of the opinions in Furman v. Georgia, supra. 
See 408 U. S., at 248, n. 11 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 294 (BREN-
NAN, J ., concurring) ("it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals 
or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punish-
ment"); id., at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("of all the people con-
victed of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible 
as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful 
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed"); id., at 313 
(WHITE, J., concurring) ("there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing 
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is 
not"). 
In Gregg, the plurality again recognized the need for legislative criteria 
to limit the death penalty to certain crimes: "[T]he decision that capital 
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expres-
sion of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so griev-
ous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the 
penalty of death." 428 U. S., at 184. The opinion also noted with ap-
proval the efforts oflegislatures to "define those crimes and those criminals 
for which capital punishment is most probably an effective deterrent." 
Id., at 186. The concurring opinion of JUSTICE WHITE in Gregg asserted 
that, over time, as the aggravating circumstance requirement was applied, 
"the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed [ would] 
become more narrowly defined and [would be] limited to those which are 
particularly serious or for which the death penalty is particularly appropri-
ate." 428 U. S., at 222. Cf. Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 
633, 636 (1977) (the State may consider as an aggravating circumstance the 
fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular du-
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Thus in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980), the Court 
struck down an aggravating circumstance that failed to nar-
row the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Jus-
tice Stewart's opinion for the plurality concluded that the ag-
gravating circumstance described in subsection (b)(7) of the 
Georgia statute, as construed by the Georgia Supreme Court, 
failed to create any "inherent restraint on the arbitrary and 
capricious infliction of the death sentence," because a person 
of ordinary sensibility could find that almost every murder fit 
the stated criteria. Id., at 428--429. 16 Moreover, the facts of 
the case itself did not distinguish the murder from any other 
murder. The plurality concluded that there was "no princi-
pled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty 
was imposed, from the many in which it was not." Id., at 
433. 
Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the 
stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty. But the Constitution 
does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravat-
This Court's conclusion in Godfrey was analogous to the Georgia Su-
preme Court's holding in Arnold v. State that the second clause of the 
(b)(l) aggravating circumstance, which is at issue in this case, was ''too 
vague and nonspecific to be applied evenhandedly by a jury." 236 Ga., at 
541. The defendant in that case, who had two prior convictions, had been 
sentenced to death by the jury solely on a finding that he had a "substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions." The court concluded 
that the words "substantial history'' were so highly subjective as to be un-
constitutional. Id., at 542; see n. 5 supra. That aggravating circum-
stance, in the view of the Georgia Supreme Court, did not provide a princi-
pled basis for distinguishing Arnold's case from the many other murder 
cases in which the death penalty was not imposed under the statute. 
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ing factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, 
those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. 17 
What is important at the selection stage is an individualized 
determination on the basis of the character of the individual 
and the circumstances of the crime. See Eddings v. Okla-
homa, 455 U. S. 104, 110-112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U. S. 586, 601-605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts (Harry) 
v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633, 636-637 (1977); Gregg, supra, at 
197 (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S., at 
251-252 (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U. S. 280, 303--304 (1976) (plurality opinion). 18 
The Georgia scheme provide tegorical narrowing at 
-;-
~-; .... 
the definition stage, and for individualize na 10n and 
ap~~llate I e_view at the se lectfon s tage. -we therefore re- ~ 
main convmeed, as we were in 1976, that the structure of the 
statute is constitutional. Moreover, the narrowing function 
has been properly achieved in this case by the two valid ag-
gravating circumstances upheld by the Georgia Supreme 
Court-that respondent had escaped from lawful confine-
ment, and that he had a prior record of conviction for a capi-
tal felony. These two findings adequately differentiate this 
case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational 
17 See Gregg, supra, at 164, 196-197, 260; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
242, 256--257, n. 14 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ. ). Similarly, the Model Penal Code draft discussed in Gregg, supra, at 
192-195, sets forth lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances but 
also provides that the sentencer "shall take into account . . . any other 
facts that it deems relevant ... " ALI Model Penal Code § 210.06 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962). 
A State is, of course, free to decide as a matter of state law to limit the 
evidence of aggravating factors that the prosecution may offer at the sen-
tencing hearing. A number of States do not permit the sentencer to con-
sider aggravating circumstances other than those enumerated in the stat-
ute. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1, 101-119 
(1980); see, e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1301(4); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9711(a)(2). 
1•See Gillers, supra n. 17, at 26--27. 
-
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way from the many Georgia murder cases in which the death 
penalty may not be imposed. Moreover, the Georgia Su-
preme Court in this case reviewed the death sentence to de-
termine whether it was arbitrary, excessive, or dispropor-
tionate. 19 Thus the absence of legislative or court-imposed 
standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of 
either or both of those aggravating circumstances does not 
render the Georgia capital sentencing statute invalid as ap-
plied in this case. 
II 
Petitioner contends that under the rule of Stromberg v. 
California, and subsequent cases, the invalidity of one of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances underlying the jury's 
sentencing verdict requires that its entire death sentence be 
set aside. In order to evaluate this contention, it is neces-
sary to identify two related but different rules that have their 
source in the Stromberg case. 
In Stromberg, a member of the Communist Party was con-
victed of displaying a red flag in violation of the California Pe-
nal Code. The California statute prohibited such a display 
(1) as a "sign, symbol or emblem" of opposition to organized 
government; (2) as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic ac-
tion; or (3) as an aid to seditious propaganda. This Court 
held that the first clause of the statute was repugnant to the 
1
• The Georgia Supreme Court conducts an independent review of the 
propriety of the sentence even when the defendant has not specifically 
raised objections at trial. See Stephens v. State, 237 Ga., at 260. In this 
case, the Georgia Supreme Court explained: 
"In performing the sentence comparison required by Code Ann. 
§ 27-2537(c)(3), this court uses for comparison purposes not only similar 
cases in which death was imposed, but similar cases in which death was not 
imposed." Id. , at 262. 
As an appendix to the opinion it provided a list of the similar cases it had 
considered, as the statute requires. Id. , at 263. See also Ross v. State, 
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federal Constitution and found it unnecessary to pass on the 
validity of the other two clauses because the jury's guilty ver-
dict might have rested exclusively on a conclusion that 
Stromberg had violated the first. The Court explained: 
"The verdict against the appellant was a general one. 
It did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As 
there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and 
the jury were instructed that their verdict might be 
given with respect to any one of them, independently 
considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of 
the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of 
these clauses, which the state court has held to be sepa-
rable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this 
record that the appellant was not convicted under that 
clause." 283 U. S. , at 367-368. 
* * * 
"The first clause of the statute being invalid upon its 
face, the conviction of the appellant, which so far as the 
record discloses may have rested upon that clause exclu-
sively, must be set aside." Id., at 369-370. 
I .. .,.. 
One rule derived from the Stromberg case requires that a 
general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed 
that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, 
and one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict 
may have. rested exclusively on the insufficient ground. The 
cases in which this rule has been applied all involved general 
verdicts based on a record that left the reviewing court un-
certain as to the actual ground on which the jury's decision 
rested. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 
287, 292 (1942); Cramer v. United States , 325 U. S. 1, 36 n. 
45 (1945); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, &-6 (1949); 
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 311-312 (1957). This 
rule does not require that respondent's death sentence be 
vacated, because the jury did not merely return a general 
verdict stating that it had found at least one aggravating cir-
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19 
stances that were valid and legally sufficient to support the 
death penalty. 
The second rule derived from the Stromberg case is illus-
trated by Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 528--529 (1945), 
and Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 58~590 (1969). In 
those cases we made clear that the reasoning of Stromberg 
encompasses a situation in which the general verdict on a sin-
gle-count indictment or information rested on both a constitu-
tional and an unconstitutional ground. In Thomas v. Col-
lins, a labor organizer's contempt citation was predicated 
both upon a speech expressing a general invitation to a group 
of nonunion workers, which the Court held to be constitution-
ally protected speech, and upon solicitation of a single indi-
vidual. The Court declined to consider the State's conten-
tion that the judgment could be sustained on the basis of the 
individual solicitation alone. 20 For the record showed that 
the penalty had been imposed on account of both solicitations. 
"The judgment therefore must be affirmed as to both or as to 
neither." 323 U. S., at 529. Similarly, in Street, the record 
indicated that petitioner's conviction on a single-count in-
dictment could have been based on his protected words as 
well as on his arguably unprotected conduct, flag-burning. 
We stated that, "unless the record negates the possibility 
that the conviction was based on both alleged violations," the 
judgment could not be affirmed unless both were valid. 394 
U. S., at 588. 
The Court's opinion in Street explained: 
''We take the rationale of Thomas to be that when a 
single-count indictment or information charges the com-
mission of a crime by virtue of the defendant's having 
done both a constitutionally protected act and one which 
20 The State neither conceded nor unequivocally denied that the sentence 
was imposed on account of both acts. "Nevertheless the State maintains 
that the invitation to O'Sullivan in itself is sufficient to sustain the judg-
ment and sentence and that nothing more need be considered to support 
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may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict ensues without 
elucidation, there is an unacceptable danger that the 
trier of fact will have regarded the two acts as 'inter-
twined' and have rested the conviction on both together. 
See 323 U. S., at 528-529, 540-541. Ibid. 
The rationale of Thomas and Street applies to cases in 
which there is no uncertainty about the multiple grounds on 
which a general verdict rests. If, under the instructions to 
the jury, one way of committing the offense is to perform an 
act protected by the Constitution, the rule of these cases re-
quires that a general verdict of guilt be set aside even if the 
defendant's unprotected conduct, considered separately, 
would support the verdict. But this second rule derived 
·";.--
from Stromberg applies only in cases in which the State has °"' 
based its prosecution, at least in part, on a charge that con- o rt'\,ss' 
stitutionally protected activity is unlawful. No such charge I 
was made in this case. 
In Stromberg, Thomas, and Street , the trial courts' judg-
ments rested , in part, on the fact that the defendant had been 
found guilty of expressive activity protected by the First 
Amendment. In contrast, in this case there is no suggestion 
that any of the aggravating circumstances involved any con-
duct protected by the First Amendment or by any other pro-, 
vision of the Constitution. Accordingly, even if the 
Stromberg rule may sometimes apply in the sentencing con-
text, a death sentence supported by at least one valid 
aggravating circumstance need not be set aside under the 
second Strom berg rule simply because another aggravating 
circumstance is "invalid" in the sense that it is insufficient by 
itself to support the death penalty. In this case, the jury's 
finding that respondent was a person who has a "substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" did not pro-
vide a sufficient basis for imposing the death sentence. But 
it raised none of the concerns underlying the holdings in 
Stromberg , Thomas, and Street , for it did not treat constitu-
tionally protected conduct as an aggravating circumstance. _ 
- -
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Two themes have been reiterated in our opinions discuss-
ing the procedures required by the Constitution in capital 
sentencing determinations. On the one hand, as the general 
comments in the Gregg plurality opinion indicated, 328 U. S., 
at 192-195, and as THE CHIEF JUSTICE explicitly noted in 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion), J 
there can be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which 
cases governmental authority should be used to impose 
death." See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 638, n. 13 
(1980). On the other hand, because there is a qualitative dif-
ference between death and any other permissible form of 
punishment, "there is a corresponding difference in the need f 
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropri-
ate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, supra, 428 U. S., at 305. "It is of vital importance to 
the defendant and to the community that any decision to im-
pose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on rea-
son rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 
430 U. S. 349, 358 (1977). Thus, although not every im-
perfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a 
capital case, to set aside a state court judgment, the severity 
of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of 
any colorable claim of error. 
Respondent contends that the death sentence was im-
paired because the judge instructed the jury with regard to 
an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance, a "substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," for these 
instructions may have affected the jury's deliberations. In I 
analyzing this contention it is essential to keep in mind the 
sense in which that aggravating circumstance is "invalid." 
It is not invalid because it authorizes a jury to draw adverse 
inferences from conduct tliat 1s consbtufaonally protected. 
Georgia has not , for example, sought to characterize the dis-
play of a red flag, cf. Stromberg v. California, the expression 
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U. S. 1 (1949), or the request for trial by jury, cf. United 
States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 (1968), as an aggravating 
circumstance. Nor has Georgia attached the "aggravating" 
label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or to-
tally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for exam-
ple the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant, 
cf. Herndon v. Georgia, 301 U. S. 242 (1937), or to conduct 
that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such 
as perhaps the defendant's mental illness. Cf. Miller v. 
Florida, 373 So. 2d 882, 885-886 (Fla. 1979). If the ag-
gravating circumstance at issue in this case had been invalid 
for reasons such as these, due process of law would require 
that the jury's decision to impose death be set aside. 
But the invalid aggravating circumstance found by the jury I 
in this case was struck down in Arnold because the Georgia 
Supreme Court concluded that it fails to provide an adequate 
basis for distinguishing a murder case in which the death pen-
alty may be imposed from those cases in which such a penalty 
may not be imposed. See p. 4, n. 5, and p. 16, supra. The 
underl~ g evidence is nevertheless fully admissible at the 
sentencing £_hase. As we noted in Gregg, supra, at 163, the 
Geo!Fa statute provides that, at the sentencing hearing, the 
judge or jury-. 
"shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitiga-
tion, and aggravation of punishment, including the 
record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of 
guilti/or pleas of"nolo contendere of the defendant, or 
the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, 
however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the 
State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial 
shall be admissible." Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2503 (empha-
sis supplied). 21 
21 See Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 873 (1980) ("Any lawful evidence which 
tends to show the motive of the defendant, his lack of remorse, his general 
~ 
u.,~h-•4~ 
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We expressly rejected petitioner's objection to the wide 
scope of evidence and argument allowed at presentence 
hearings. 
''We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not 
to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that 
can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open and 
far-ranging argument. . . . So long as the evidence in-
troduced and the arguments made at the presentence 
hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not 
to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the 
jury to have as much information before it as possible 
when it makes the sentencing decision." 428 U. S., at 
20~204. See id., at 20~207; see also n. 17, supra. 
Thus, any evidence on which the jury might have relied in 
this case to find that respondent had previously been con-
victed of a sub~ numbe~ of serious assaultive offenses, 
as he concedes he had been, was properly adgy_ced at the sen-
tencing hearing and was fulli subject to explanation by the 
defendant. 22 Cf. Gardner v. Florida, supra (requiring that 
the defendant have the opportunity to rebut evidence and 
State's theory in sentencing proceeding); Presnell v. Geor-
moral character, and his predisposition to commit other crimes is admissi-
ble in aggravation, subject to the notice provisions of the statute."). 
22 "The purpose of Code Ann. § 27-2503(a) is to allow a defendant to ex-
amine his record to determine if the convictions are in fact his, if he was 
represented by counsel, and any other defect which would render such doc-
uments inadmissible during the pre-sentencing phase of the trial. " Her-
ring v. State, 238 Ga. 288, 290, 232 $.E. 2d 826 (1977). See Franklin v. 
State , 245 Ga. 141, 149-150 (1980). As we held in United States v. Tucker, 
404 U. S. 443, 447-449 (1972), even in a noncapital sentencing proceeding, 
the sentence must be set aside if the trial court relied at least in part on 
"misinformation of constitutional magnitude" such as prior uncounseled 
convictions that were unconstitutionally imposed. See Toumsend v. l 
Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740-741 (1948) (reversing a sentence imposed on 
uncounseled defendant because it was based on "extensively and materially 






ZANT v. STEPHENS 
-
gia, 439 U. S. 14, 14, n.3 (1978) (same). 23 This case involves 
a statutory aggravating circumstance, invalidated by the 
state Supreme Court on grounds of vagueness, whose terms 
plausibly described aspects of the defendant's background 
that were properly before the jury and whose accuracy was 
unchallenged. Hence the erroneous instruction does not im-
plicate our repeated recognition that the "qualitative differ-
ence between death and other penalties calls for a greater de-
gree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed." 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S., at 604 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). 
Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged on rehearing 
that the evidence was admissible, it expressed the concern 
that the trial court's instructions "may have unduly directed 
the jury's attention to his prior conviction." But, assuming 
that the instruction did induce the jury to place greater em-
phasis upon the respondent's prior criminal record than it 
would otherwise have done, the question remains whether 
that emphasis violated any constitutional right. In answer-
ing this question, it is appropriate to compare the instruction 
that was actually given, see p. 3 supra, with an instruction on 
the same subject that would have been unobjectionable. Cf. 
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154-157 (1977). Nothing 
in the United States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from 
instructing a jury that it would be appropriate to take ac-
23 The State acknowledges that, if an invalid statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance were supported by material evidence not properly before the 
jury, a different case would be presented. Brief for the Petitioner 13, 
Supplemental Memorandum for Petitioner 18, Tr. of Or. Arg. 14, 18-20. 
We need not decide whether the death sentence would be impaired in 
other circumstances, for example, if the jury's findings included an ag-
gravating circumstance which the appellate court finds to be unsupported 
by sufficient evidence, see, e. g., Williams v. State, supra, 621 S.W. 2d, at 
687 (absence of proper supporting proof of prior violent felony); State v. 
Moore, supra, 614 S.W. 2d, at 351 (same); State v. Irwin, supra, 282 S.E. 
2d, at 445--448 (evidence insufficient to support kidnapping as aggravating 
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count of a defendant's prior criminal record in making its sen-
tencing determination, see n. 17 supra, even though the de-
fendant's prior history of noncapital convictions could not by 
itself provide sufficient justification for imposing the death 
sentence. There would have been no constitutional infirmity 
in an instruction stating, in substance: "If you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is a person who has pre-
viously been convicted of a capital felony, or that he has es-
caped from lawful confinement, you will be authorized to im-
pose the death sentence, and in deciding whether or not that 
sentence is appropriate you may consider the remainder of 
his prior criminal record. " 
The effect the erroneous instruction may have had on the 
jury is therefore merely a consequence of the statutory label 
"aggravating circumstance." That label arguably might 
have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to re-
spondent's prior criminal record than it otherwise would have 
given. But we do not think the Georgia Supreme Court 
erred in its conclusion that the "mere fact that some of the 
aggravating circumstances presented were improperly desig-
nated 'statutory"' had "an inconsequential impact -on the ju-
ry's decision regarding the death penalty." The instruc-
tions, see p. 3 supra, did not place particular emphasis on the 
role of statutory aggravating circumstances in the jury's ulti-
mate decision. Instead the trial court instructed the jury to 
"consider all of the evidence received in court throughout the 
trial before you" and to "consider all facts and circumstances 
presented in extinuation [sic] , mitigation and aggravation of 
punishment as well as such arguments as have been pre-
sented for the State and for the Defense." App. 18. More 
importantly, for the reasons discussed above, any possible 
impact cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in 
the sentencing process. 24 
u The Georgia Supreme Court's affirmance of this case on direct appeal I 
implicitly approves the jury instructions as an accurate reflection of state 
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Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of 
an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate 
review of each death sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court 
to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality. 25 We 
accept that court's view that the subsequent invalidation of 
one of several statutory aggravating circumstances does not 
automatically require reversal of the death penalty, having 
been assured that a death sentence will be set aside if the 
invalidation of an aggravating circumstance makes the pen-
alty arbitrary or capricious. 250 Ga., at 101, 297 S.E. 2d, at 
4. The Georgia Supreme Court, in its response to our certi-
fied question, expressly stated, "A different result might be 
reached in a case where evidence was submitted in support of 
tion of Georgia's statutory scheme given in the Georgia Supreme Court's 
response to our certified question. According to the response, see p. 9 
supra, "Unless at least one of the ten statutory aggravating circumstances 
exists, the death penalty may not be imposed in any event. If there exists 
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the death penalty may be 
imposed but the factfinder has a discretion to decline to do so without giv-
ing any reason .... In making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder 
takes into consideration all circumstances before it from both the guilt-in-
nocence and the sentence phases of the trial." This is precisely what the 
trial court told the jury: "Now in arriving at your determinations in this 
regard you are authorized to consider all of the evidence received in court 
throughout the trial before you. You are furt_her authorized to consider all 
facts and circumstances presented in extinuation (sic), mitigation and ag-
gravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented 
for the State and for the Defense .... Unless one or more of these statu-
tory aggravating circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt you 
will not be authorized to fix punishment at death. . . . If you fix punish-
ment at death by electrocution you would recite in the exact words which I 
have given you the one or more circumstances you found to be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt. ... [If you recommend life imprisonment] it 
would not.be necessary for you to recite any mitigating or aggravating cir-
cumstances as you may find, and you would simply state in your verdict, 
We fix punishment at life in prison." See Zant v. Stephens , -- U. S. 
-, - n. 1 (1982). 
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a statutory aggravating circumstance which was not other-
wise admissible, and thereafter the circumstance failed." As 
we noted in Gregg, 428 U. S., at 204-205, we have also been 
assured that a death sentence will be vacated if it is excessive 
or substantially disproportionate to the penalties that have 
been imposed under similar circumstances. 
Finally, we note that in deciding this case we do not ex-
press any o inion concerning the ossible si · c nee of a 
holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is 
"invalid" under a statutory sclieme Tn which the judge or jury 
is specifically instructed to wei h statutory a avating and 
mitiga mg circumstances in exercising its discretion whether -=--=-=-...,..- .,,,. 
to impose the death penalty. See n. 12 supra. As we have 
discussed, see pp. 10-18 supra, the Constitution does not re-
quire a State to adopt specific standards for instructing the 
jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, and Georgia has not adopted such a system. 
Under Georgia's sentencing scheme, and under the trial 
judge's instructions in this case, no suggestion is made that 
the presence of more than one aggravating circumstance 
should be given special weight. Whether or not the jury had 
concluded that respondent's prior record of criminal convic-
tions merited the label "substantial" or the label "assaultive," 
the jury was plainly entitled to consider that record, together 
with all of the other evidence before it, in making its sentenc-
ing determination. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
-- ~ ~
No. 81-S9 ~ ......,  )--
WALTER ZANT, WARDEN, PETITIONER, v.uf uu-,,,,, 
ALPHA OTIS O'DANIEL STEPHENS ~~ 
~~ I 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COl)"R/J (2!' - - ' 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 1-t) t:74_ • C/-
[May 3, 1982) 
PER CURIAM. 
The respondent was convicted of murder in a Georgia Su-
perior Court. His sentencing jury found the following statu-
tory aggravating circumstances: 1 
1 The trial judge instructed the sentencing jury as follows: 
"Gentlemen of the Jury, the defendant in this case has been found guilty 
at your hands of the offense of Murder, and it is your duty to make certain 
determinations with respect to the penalty to be imposed as punishment 
for that offense. Now in arriving at your determinations in this regard 
you are authorized to consider all of the evidence received in court through-
out the trial before you. You are further authorized to consider all facts 
and circumstances presented in extinuation [sic], mitigation and aggrava-
tion of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for 
the State and for the Defense. Under the law of this State every person 
guilty of Murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, 
the sentence to be fixed by the jury trying the case. In all cases of Murder 
for which the death penalty may be authorized the jury shall consider any 
mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances authorized by law. 
You may consider any of the following statutory aggravating circum-
stances which you find are supported by the evidence. One, the offense of 
Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a 
Capital felony, or the offense of Murder was committed by a person who 
has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. Two, 
the offense of Murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man in that it .involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery 
to the victim. Three, the offense of Murder was committed by a person 
L.i.fi1'\l.l 'V. 0.l~.ril~1'\IO 
"(1) that the offense of murder was committed by a per-
son with a prior record of conviction of a capital felony, 
Code Ann. §27-2534.l(b)(l); (2) that the murder was 
committed by a person who has a substantial history of 
serious assaultive criminal convictions, Code Ann. 
§ 27-2534. l(b)(l), supra; and, (3) that the offense of mur-
der was committed by a person who had escaped from 
the lawful custody of a peace officer or a place of lawful 
confinement, Code Ann. §27-2534.l(b)(9)." Stephens v. 
Hbpper, 241 Ga. 596, 597-598, 247 S.E. 2d 92, 94, cert. 
denied, 439 U. S. 991 (1978) . 
'he jury imposed the death penalty. On direct appeal, the 
ho has escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of law-
ll confinement. These possible statutory circumstances are stated in 
riting and will be out with you during your deliberations on the sentenc-
1g phase of this case. They are in writing here, and I shall send this out 
ith you. If the jury verdict on sentencing fixes punishment at death by 
. ectrocution you shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman, the ag-
ravating circumstances or circumstance which you found to have been 
roven beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless one or more of these statutory 
~gravating circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt you will 
lt be authorized to fix punishment at death. If you fix punishment at 
eath by electrocution you would recite in the exact words which I have 
iven you the one or more circumstances you found to be proven beyond a 
iasonable doubt. You would so state in your verdict, and after reciting 
1is you would state, We fix punishment at death. On the other hand, if 
DU recommend mercy for the defendant this will result in imprisonment 
1r life of the defendant. In such case it would not be necessary for you to 
icite any mitigating or aggravating circumstances as you may find, and 
ou would simply state in your verdict, We fix punishment at life in prison. 
'ow, whatever your verdict may be with respect to the responsibility you 
ave regarding sentencing please write these out, Mr. Foreman, immedi-
;ely below the previous verdict you have rendered. Be sure that it is 
ated and that it bears your signature as foreman. Once again when you 
ave arrived at your verdict on the sentencing phase of the case let us 
now. We will then receive the verdict from you and have it published 
ere in open court. Please retire now and consider the sentence in this 
1Se." App. 18-19. 
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Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Stephens v. State, 237 
Ga. 259, 227 S.E. 2d 261, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 986 (1976). 
On the authority of Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E. 2d 
386 (1976), it set aside the second statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance found by the jury. It upheld the death sentence, 
however, on the ground that in Arnold "that was the sole ag-
gravating circumstance found by the jury," whereas in the 
case under review "the evidence supports the jury's findings 
of the other statutory aggravating circumstances, and conse-
quently the sentence is not impaired." 237 Ga., at 261-262, 
227 S.E. 2d, at 263. 
After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Steph-
ens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E. 2d 92, cert. denied, 439 
U. S. 991 (1978), the respondent applied for a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal district court. Relief was denied by that 
court, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth {' /l !>-
Circuit "reverse[d] the district court's denial of habeas corpus 
relief insofar as it le[ft] standing the [respondent's] death 
sentence, and ... remanded for further proceedings." 631 
F. 2d 397, 407 (CAS-1980), modiffed, 648 F. 2d 446 (1981). 
We granted the State's petition for certiorari. -- U. S. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), we upheld the 
Georgia death penalty statute because the standards and pro-
cedures set forth therein promised to alleviate to a significant 
degree the concern of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 
(1972), that the de~th penalty not be imposed capriciously or 
in a freakish manner. We recognized that the constitutional-
ity of Georgia death sentences ultimately would depend on 
the Georgia Supreme Court construing the statute and re-
viewing capital sentences consistently with this concern. 
See 428 U.S., at 198, 201-206 (Opinion of Stewart, POWELL, 
and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 211-212, 222-224 (WHITE, J., con-
curring in jud~ent). Our review of the statute did not lead 
us to examine all of its nuances. It was only after the state 
law relating to capital sentencing was clarified in concrete 
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11e death penalty. After making the finding that the death 
enalty is a possible punishment, the jury then makes a sepa-
ate finding whether the death penalty should be imposed. 
t bases this finding "not upon the statutory aggravating cir-
umstances but upon all the evidence before the jury in ag-
ravation and mitigation of punishment which ha[s] been in-
roduced at both phases of the trial." Brief for Petitioner 13. 
In view of the foregoing uncertainty, it would be prema-
1re to decide whether such determinations, or any of the 
thers we might conceive as a basis for the Georgia Supreme 
:ourt's position, might undermine the confidence we ex-
ressed in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, that the Georgia capital-
entencing system, as we understood it then, would avoid the 
rbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty and 
rould otherwise pass constitutional muster. Suffice it to say 
1at the state-law premises of the Georgia Supreme Court's 
onclusion of state law are relevant to the constitutional issue 
t hand. 
The Georgia Supreme Court under certain circumstances 
rill decide questions of state law upon certification from this 
:ourt. See Ga. Code Ann. § 24--4536. 4 We invoke that 
tatute to certify the following question: What are the 
remises of state law that support the conclusion that the 
eath sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of 
ne of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the 
1ry? 
The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit this certifi-
:1.te, signed by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and under the official 
• "When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States ... 
1at there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or proposi-
ons of the laws of this State which are determinative of said cause and 
1ere are no clear controlling precedents in the appellate court decisions of 
tis State, such Federal appellate court may certify such questions or prop-
;itions of the laws of Georgia to this court for instructions concerning such 
1estions or propositions." Ga. Code Ann. § 24--4536(a). 
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seal of the Court, as well as the briefs and record filed with 
the Court, to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and simulta-
neously to transmit copies of the certificate to the attorneys 
for the respective parties. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81--89 
WALTER ZANT, WARDEN, PETITIONER, v. 
ALPHA OTIS O'DANIEL STEPHENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May 3, 1982) 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, 
dissenting. 
Six years ago in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, l93 (1976) 
(joint opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), this 
Court declared: 
"Juries are invariably given careful instructions on the 
law and how to apply it before they are authorized to de-
cide the merits of a lawsuit. It would be virtually un-
thinkable to follow any other course in a legal system 
that has traditionally operated by following prior prece-
dents and fixed rules of law. . . . When erroneous in-
structions are given, retrial is often required. It is 
quite simply a hallmark of our legal system that juries be 
carefully and adequately guided in their deliberations." 
(citations and footnote omitted). 
In today's decision, a majority of this Court intimates that 
a post hoc construction of a death penalty statute by the 
State's highest court may remedy the fact that a jury was im-
properly instructed with respect to the very factors that save 
the Georgia statute from unconstitutionality. See Gregg v. 
Georgia, supra. Because I cannot see how the Georgia Su-
preme Court's response to this Court's certification could 
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mstitutionally justify the imposition of the death penalty in 
1is case, I must dissent. 
I 
I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circum-
~ances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
:ighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg v. Georgia, 
l),pra, at 231. Even if I believed that the death penalty 
)Uld constitutionally be imposed under certain circum-
~ances, however, I believe that respondent Stephens' sen-
mce must be vacated and his case remanded to the Georgia 
tate courts for resentencing. 
II 
In my opinion, remanding this case for resentencing is 
)mpelled by this Court's decisions upholding the constitu-
.onality of the Georgia death penalty statute, and by well 
ecognized principles of appellate review. Therefore, 
rhether or not the Georgia Supreme Court's construction of 
1e statute in response to this Court's certification might 
void the constitutional infirmity inherent in respondent's 
entence in some future case, it can do nothing to alter the 
lCt that respondent's death sentence may have been based in 
art on consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating 
lrcumstance. 
Under Georgia law, certification is appropriate "[ w ]hen it 
hall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States ... 
~at there are involved in any proceeding before it questions 
r propositions of the laws of this State which are determi-
ative of said cause and there are no clear controlling prece-
ents in the appellate court decisions of this State." Ga . 
!ode § 24-4536(a) (emphasis added). The majority attempts 
D bring this case within the ambit of this certification proce-
ure by indicating that "[i]t may be that ... multiple findings 
f statutory aggravating circumstances are superflous, or 
. . the reviewing court may assume the role of the jury 
rhen the sentencing jury recommended the death penalty 
.nder legally erroneous instructions. " Ante, at 5. The ma-
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jority then requests the Georgia Supreme Court to clarify 
"the premises of state law that support the conclusion that 
the death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalid-
ity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found 
by the jury." Ante, at 6. 
I wholeheartedly agree that we do not know the answers to 
these questions. The majority recognizes that we do not 
possess this information because "[t]he Georgia Supreme 
Court has never explained the rationale for it s position" that 
a death sentence may be reaffirmed when one of the ag-
gravating circumstances relied on by the jury is declared 
invalid. Ante, at 4-5. I submit, however, that we are not 
alone in our ignorance. There is absolutely no indication 
that the jury sentencing respondent to death or the judge 
who instructed that jury was any more aware of the answers 
to these questions than we are today. Indeed, by certifying 
these questions to the Georgia Supreme Court, the majority 
concedes that it was impossible for anyone to know the an-
swers to these questions at the time respondent was sen-
tenced to death, because "there are no controlling prece-
dents" in Georgia on these issues. Given this Court's prior 
treatment of cases in which a defendant received a sentence, 
particularly a death sentence, on the basis of erroneous jury 
instructions, I do not understand how the Georgia Supreme 
Court's answer to the certified question could possibly be 
"determinative" of this case. 
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972) this Court 
struck down death penalties imposed pursuant to a Georgia 
statute. Shortly thereafter, the Georgia legislature enacted 
the current death penalty statute. This statute provides for 
a separate sentencing proceeding after the defendant has 
been found guilty of a capital offense. During the sentencing 
phase, the trial judge shall instruct the jury 1 to consider 
"any of the [10] statutory aggravating circumstances 
' In bench trials, the judge must consider these factors. 
ZANT v. STEPHENS 
·hich may be supported by the evidence." Ga. Code 
27-2534. l(b). The aggravating circumstances found by the 
tdge to be warranted by the evidence are submitted to the 
try in writing to be used during its deliberations. Id., 
27-2534.l(c). If the jury recommends a death sentence, it 
;hall designate in writing ... the aggravating circumstance 
r circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt." 
i., §27-2534.l(c). Even if it finds that one or more ag-
ravating circumstances has been established beyond a rea-
mable doubt, the jury is not required to impose the death 
enalty. See Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492, 246 S.E. 2d 322 
.978). The jury's verdict to impose the death penalty must 
e unanimous. Miller v. State, 237 Ga. 557, 229 S.E. 2d 376 
.976). The trial judge is bound by the jury's recommenda-
on of sentence, whether that recommendation be life or 
eath. Ga. Code §§ 26-3102, 27-2514. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), this Court held 
1at this statutory scheme satisfied the constitutional guar-
nty against cruel and unusual punishment. In reaching this 
mclusion, the two principal joint opinions relied heavily on 
1e fact that the aggravating circumstances served to guide 
1e jury's discretion. Announcing the judgment of the 
:ourt, Justice Stewart emphasized that because "the mem-
ers of a jury will have had little, if any, previous experience 
1 sentencing," id., at 192, they should be given specific 
~andards to guide their sentencing deliberations, such as 
1ose provided in the Model Penal Code, which catalogs "'the 
1ain circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that 
riould be weighed and weighed against each other'" by the 
1ry. Id., at 193 (quoting ALI, Model Penal Code § 201.6, 
:omment 3, p. 71 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)) (emphasis in 
riginal). Justice Stewart found that the new Georgia stat-
te satisfied this requirement because, through the statutory 
ggravating circumstances, "[t]he new Georgia sentencing 
rocedures ... focus the jury's attention on the particular-
;ed nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics 
·i 
ZANT v. STEPHENS 5 
of the individual defendant. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 
U. S., at 206 (Opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.) (emphasis added). JUSTICE WHITE, joined by THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the 
judgment placed an even stronger emphasis on the role of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances: 
"The Georgia Legislature has plainly made an effort to 
guide the jury in the exercise of its discretion, while at 
the same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on 
the basis of factors too intangible to write into a statute. 
. . . As the types of murders for which the death pen-
alty may be imposed become more narrowly defined and 
are limited to those which are particularly serious or for 
which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate as they 
are in Georgia by reason of the aggravating-circum-
stance requirement, it becomes reasonable to expect that 
juries-even given discretion not to impose the death 
penalty-will impose the death penalty in a substantial 
portion of the cases so defined." Id., at 222 (WHITE, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality 
opinion of Stewart, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.), this Court reaffirmed the role of aggravating circum-
stances in protecting against the arbitrary impostition of the 
death penalty. The Godfrey Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of a death sentence imposed in reliance on aggravat-
ing circumstance § (b)(7), which allows a jury to impose the 
death sentence if it finds that the murder "was outrageously 
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved tor-
ture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the vic-
tim." Ga. Code §27-2534.l(b)(7). 
The plurality opinion found: "There is nothing in these few 
words standing alone, that implies any mherent restraint on 
the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. 
A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize al-
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1ost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
1le and inhuman."' 446 U. S., at 428-429. Section (b)(7), if 
onstrued broadly enough to encompass every murder, would 
,e uncqnstitutional because it provides "no principled way to 
.istinguish this case, in which the death penalty was im-
,osed, from the many cases in which it was not." Id., at 433. 
'he plurality found it significant that this interpretation of 
(b)(7) "may ... have been one to which the members of the 
llry in this case subscribed," and that, if the jury did hold 
his view "their preconceptions were not dispelled by the 
rial judge's sentencing instructions." Id. , at 429. There-
ore, the jury was not given appropriate guidance, and the 
teath sentence could not constitutionally be imposed. 
In my view, this reasoning requires that respondent's 
leath sentence be vacated and that this case be remanded so 
1e can be resentenced by a properly instructed jury. It is 
onceded that the jury in this case was instructed on an ag-
:ravating circumstance that the Georgia Supreme Court has 
ince declared unconstitutional. If this were the only ag-
:ravating circumstance found by the jury, it is also undis-
1uted that the State would be unable to impose the death 
entence, see Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E. 2d 386 
1976), even if the Georgia Supreme Court determined that 
he evidence supported a finding of other statutory aggravat-
ng circumstances. Cf. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 14, 16 
1978). Petitioner argues, however, because the jury found 
wo other statutory aggravating circumstances that the 
ieorgia Supreme Court found to be supported by the evi-
lence, that court could reaffirm the death sentence. This 
1rgument flies in the face of the reasoning of the Godfrey plu-
-ality which found it crucial that the jury's decision to impose 
he death sentence be guided by clear and appropriate 
nstructions. 
Moreover, this argument is patently contrary to the settled 
,rinciple that "if the jury has been instructed to consider sev-
iral grounds for conviction, one of which proves to be uncon-
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stitutional, and the reviewing court is thereafter unable to 
determine from the record whether the jury relied on the un-
constitutional ground, the verdict must be set aside." Steph-
ens v. Zant, 631 F. 2d 397, 406 (CA5 1980); see Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). Since 1931, this Court has 
consistently declined to speculate about whether a particular 
jury would have reached the same conclusion in the absence 
of an unconstitutional instruction. See, e.g., id., at 367-368 
(1931). Accord Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 
570-571 (1970); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 585-588 
(1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 311-312 (1957). 
In light of this Court's consistent recognition that ''the _pen-
alty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment," Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 303, 
305 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); 
see, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, --U. S. --, --(1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring), there is certainly no reason to 
engage in such speculation here. Yet, the jury is not re-
quired to recommend death even if it finds that one or more 
aggravating circumstances has been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Therefore, to adopt the bald pronounce-
ment that "[ w ]here two or more statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances are found by the jury, the failure of one circum-
stance does not so taint the proceedings as to invalidate the 
other aggravating circumstance found and the sentence of 
death thereon," Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 599, 261 S.E. 
2d 349, 358 (1979), we would have to speculate that the 
jury's decision to impose the death penalty was not influ-
enced by the presence of the unconstitutional aggravating 
circumstance. 2 
2 To date, the majority of state courts that have confronted this issue 
have declined to speculate whether the jury would still have returned a 
death sentence in the absence of the subsequently invalidated aggravating 
circumstance. See, e. g., Williams v. State, 621 S.W. 2d 686, 687-688 
(Ark. 1981); State v. Irurin, 282 S.E. 2d 439, 448-449 (N.C. 1981); State v. 
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Recognizing that settled law normally requires that sen-
;ences arguably imposed on the basis of unconstitutional in-
;tructions cannot stand, petitioner and several states in an 
imicus curiae brief 3 attempt to distinguish the Stromberg 
ine of cases by arguing that, as a matter of statutory con-
;truction, a jury's finding that one of the ten aggravating cir-
:umstances has been established beyond a reasonable doubt 
s irrelevant to its ultimate conclusion that the death penalty 
:hould be imposed. Specifically, petitioner argues that the 
.erm "aggravating circumstance" actually has two entirely 
lifferent meanings, with each meaning representing a sepa-
·ate task that a capital sentencing jury must perform. 
i'irst, the jury must determine whether any of the ten statu-
ory "aggravating circumstances" has been established be-
'ond a reasonable doubt. This, petitioner argues, is a 
hreshold determination that only allows the jury to consider 
he death penalty, but has no impact on whether that penalty 
hould be imposed. After reaching this threshold deter-
nination, the jury may consider any "evidence in aggrava-
ion" or mitigation in reaching its conclusion as to whether 
he dealth penalty should be imposed. According to peti-
ioner, the jury perfoms this second task free of any influence 
rom the very "legislative guidelines" that, by "focus[ing] the 
ury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and 
he particularized characteristics of the individual defend-
nt," prevent the death penalty from being wantonly and 
reakishly imposed. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U. S., at 
06-207 (plurality opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STE-
'ENS, JJ.). 
foore, 614 S.W. 2d 348, 351--352 (Tenn. 1981); Hopkins v. State, 632 P. 2d 
g, 171-172 (Wy. 1981). See also Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251, 
255-1257 (Ala. App. 1979). 
3 The States of Alabama, California, Florida, Missouri, North Carolina, 
outh Carolina, and Utah submitted an amicus brief on behalf of petitioner. 
; is interesting to note that the appellate courts of Alabama and North 
arolina have already implicitly rejected the construction now urged by 
1ese States as amicus. Seen. 2, supra. 
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Putting to one side both the plausibility and the constitu-
tionality of petitioner's construction of the Georgia death pen-
alty statute, 4 it is patently obvious that this ex post facto at-
tempt to avoid the clear mandate of Strom berg cannot 
possibly remedy the constitutional infirmity of respondent's 
sentence. This conclusion is compelled by this Court's deci-
sion in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). In 
Sandstrom, a defendant was convicted of "deliberate homi-
cide," which, under Montana law, required the State to prove 
that he "purposefully or knowingly" caused the death of the 
victim. Id., at 512. At the close of all the evidence, the 
judge instructed the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a per-
son intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 
Id. , at 513. The defendant objected to this instruction on 
the ground that it unconstitutionally shifted the burden of 
proof on the issue of intent. On direct appeal, the Montana 
Supreme Court conceded that shifting the burden of proof in 
a criminal case was unconstitutional. It nevertheless upheld 
the challenged instruction on the ground that under its inter-
pretation, the instruction only shifted the burden of produc-
tion rather than the burden of persuasion. Id. , at 513-514. 
In the proceedings before this Court, the State argued that 
the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of the effect of 
the presumption was conclusive on this Court. Id., at 516. 
This Court unanimously 5 rejected the State's attempt to 
avoid the constitutional issue by the use of a post hoc narrow-
ing construction by the State's highest court. While 
acknowledging that "[t]he Supreme Copurt of Montana is ... 
the final authority on the legal weight to be given a presump-
tion under Montana law, ... it is not the final authority on 
the interpretation which a jury could have given the [ chal-
'In my view, if the Georgia Supreme Court adopted this interpretation 
of their death penalty statute, it would raise serious questions as to the 
constitutionality of this statute under Gregg. 
5 JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE filed a separate 
opinion concurring in both the judgment and the opinion of the Court. 
ZANT v. STEPHENS 
mged] instruction." Id., at 516-517 (emphasis added). 
nstead, this Court defined the relevant question as whether 
a reasonable juror could have been misled by the instruc-
:on." Id., at 517. Even assuming the constitutionality of 
:1e Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of the presump-
:on, an interpretation that this Court conceded might have 
een in the minds of "some jurors," the fact that "a reason-
ble juror could have given the presumption conclusive or 
ersuasiori-shifting effect means that we cannot discount the 
ossibility that Sandstrom's jurors actually did proceed upon 
ne or the other of these latter interpretations." Id., at 519 
~mphasis added). "Because David Sandstom's jury may 
ave interpreted the judge's instruction as constituting ei-
~er a burden-shifting presumption ... , or a conclusive pre-
umption," id., at 524, this Court held the instruction uncon-
titutional and remanded the case to the state courts for 
roceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. 6 
In my view, the case presently before the Court presents 
ven a stronger case for rejecting the relevance of an ex post 
icto saving construction. By certifying this question to the 
;eorgia Supreme Court, the majority concedes that this con-
6 The Sandstrom Court also rejected the State's argument that the jury 
eed not have relied on the challenged instruction in finding Sandstrom 
t1ilty of intentional murder. The State reasoned that because the tainted 
tstruction could arguably be viewed as only relating to the defendant's 
)Urpose," the jury might have convicted Sandstrom solely on the ground 
1at he "knowingly" caused the death of the victim. Because the statute 
rily requires that the crime be committed "purposefully or knowingly," 
1e State argued that there was an alternative basis on which the convic-
on could be sustained. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 525 
.979). Relying on Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), this 
ourt refused to engage in such speculation, since "even if a jury could 
ave ignored the presumption and found defendant guilty because he acted 
nowingly, we cannot be certain that this is what they did do." 442 U. S., 
l 526 (emphasis in original). There is similarly no way to tell whether 
~spondent's jury adopted the Georgia Supreme Court's yet undisclosed in-
irpretation of the Georgia death penalty statute. 
L;.tU~ .l "U. O.l£Jrll£Jl~O .L.L 
struction has never been explicitly adopted by the Georgia 
courts. It must also be acknowledged that petitioner's inter-
pretation of the jury's role under the Georgia law is not the 
only, or even the most plausible, construction of the death 
penalty statute. A "reasonable juror" could fairly conclude 
that he or she was required to place special emphasis on the 
existance of statutory aggravating circumstances, and weigh 
them against each other and against any mitigating circum-
stances, when deciding whether or not to impose the death 
penalty. Cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, at 428-429. Cer-
tainly several members of this Court have operated under 
this assumption. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U. S., at 
197-198, 221-222; Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, at 436--437 
(MARSHALL, J., concurring in the judgment); Drake v. Zant, 
449 U. S. 999, 1001 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari). 
If respondent's jury subscribed to this interpretation of 
their role, "their preconceptions were not dispelled by the 
trial judge's sentencing instructions." Id., at 429. Indeed, 
everything about the judge's charge highlighted the impor-
tance of the aggravating circumstances. Not only were the 
circumstances submitted to the jury in writing, but the jury 
was in turn required to write down each and every aggravat-
ing circumstance that it found to be established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. See Ga. Code § 27-2534.l(c) discussed 
supra, at --. The jury instructions provide absolutely no 
indication that, after carefully considering each of the 
stautory aggravating circumstances submitted by the trial 
judge, the jury should, or even could, discard this list of offi-
cially sanctioned grounds for imposing the death penalty in 
deciding whether to actually sentence respondent to death. 
Absent even a shred of evidence that respondent's trial 
judge and jury were cognizant of petitioner's asserted con-
struction of the Georgia death penalty statute, a construction 
2 ZANT v. STEPHENS 
tever acknowledged by any Georgia appellate court, we can 
,nly speculate whether "the verdict in this case was not deci-
ively affected by an unconstitutional statutory aggravating 
ircumstance." Stephens v. Zant, 631 F. 2d, at 406. It is 
,recisely to guard against such speculation that this Court 
tas uniformly refused to uphold a conviction or sentence that 
night have been based even in part on an unconstitutional 
~ound. 7 See supra, at --. Furthermore, in Gregg v. 
;eorgia, supra, at 189, this Court made clear that "where 
liscretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave 
,s the determination of whether a human life should be taken 
,r spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and lim-
ted so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
ious action." See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238. 
~ecause nothing the Supreme Court of Georgia can say in re-
ponse to this Court's certification will assure us that re-
pondent's jury was "suitably directed," 8 I must dissent. 
7 It is irrelevant whether the jury's determination was only partially 
,ased on the presence of the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance. 
ls this Court held in Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969), "even as-
urning that the record precludes the inference that appellant's conviction 
1ight have been based solely on [an unconstitutional ground], we are still 
,ound to reverse if the conviction could have been based upon both" an un-
onstitutional and a constitutional ground. Id., at 587 (emphasis in 
riginal). 
8 The majority's implication that certifying this case will give the Geor-
ja Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify whether it has the power to 
assume the role of the jury when the sentencing jury recommended the 
eath penalty under legally erroneous instructions," ante, at 5, does not 
lter my conclusion. In affirming respondent's death sentence, the Geor-
ja Supreme Court did not purport to exercise such authority. Nor did 
he State argue that such action by the Georgia Supreme Court was per-
11issible in the proceedings before this Court. Indeed, prior to this 
;ourt's action today, it has always been assumed that "only the trier of fact 
11ay impose a death sentence." Willis v. Balkcom, -- U. S. - ·- (1981) 
MARSHALL, BRENNAN, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting from the denial of 
ertiorari). In any event, a "reviewing court can determine only whether 
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a rational jury might have imposed the death penalty if it had been prop-
erly instructed; it is impossible for it to say whether a particular jury would 
have so exercised its discretion ifit had known the law." Godfrey v. Geor-
gia, 446 U. S., at 437 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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WALTER ZANT, WARDEN, PETITIONER, v. 
ALPHA OTIS O'DANIEL STEPHENS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May 3, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I am in essential agreement with the views expressed by 
JUSTICE MARSHALL in Part II of his dissenting opinion, and 
with his conclusion that the death sentence \\;as imposed 
under instructions that could have misled the jury. I would 
not7ioid,"'however, that the case must be remanded for re-
sentencing by a jury. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit simply reversed 
and remanded thus leaving it to the Georgia Supreme Court 
to determine whether resentencing by a · ur is required in 
this case. It may e that un er eorgia aw the State Su-
preme Court lacks authority to resentence itself, rather than I 
leave this role to a jury. If that should be the case, I would 
leave open-also for the Supreme Court of Georgia to de-
cide-whether it has authority to find that the instruction 
was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
s' ~ )4 ~ ~ U-v~ 
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Please join me. 
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May 23, 1983 
Re: 81-89 - Zant v. Stephens 
Dear John, 
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 588, the Court said 
that there was no Stromberg-Thomas hazard "when the indictment or 
information is in several counts and the conviction is explicitly 
declared to rest on findings of guilt on certain of those counts, 
for in such instances there is positive evidence that the trier 
of fact considered each count on its own merits and separately 
from the others." (footnote omitted) In such cases, a 
conviction on one count neither rests on nor is intertwined with 
the conviction on another. If the former is valid on its own 
bottom, the conviction stands, and so does the sentence. 
Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1981) 1 Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1959). 
It seems to me that in a capital case where each of several 
aggravating circumstances is specifically found by the jury and 
it turns out that one of those circumstances is invalid, the 
situation is similar to the above reservation in Street. The 
aggravating circumstances are independent of each other and there 
would not seem to be a Street problem as such. 
Of course, even in a non-balancing state such as Georgia, 
where in arriving at its sentencing decision . the jury is 
instructed to consider all the evidence, this would leave the 
question whether its decision is tainted where the evidence 
supporting the invalid aggravating circumstances related to 
constitutionally protected conduct. In this sense, the 
aggravating circumstances are intertwined, but is it a Street 
issue? 
I should mention another i tern. You say in n. 23, p. 24, 
that we need not decide whether the death sentence would be 
impaired if the jury's findings included an aggravating 
circumstance which the appellate court finds to be unsupported by 
sufficient evidence. I had thought that under your reasoning the 
death sentence in such a situation would clearly be sustainable. 
- -
Since I would suppose a common basis for invalidating an 
aggravating circumstance would be insufficiency of the evidence, 
I would not leave this issue open. 
I had other concerns with your first draft, but I can live 
with the way they are handled in your second draft. Where this 
leaves me, I'm not quite sure, Perhaps you can allay my concerns 
and I can join you outright. I would like to since there should 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 24, 198 3 
Re: 81-89 - Zant v . Stephens 
Dear Byron: 
Your letter makes a lot of sense. Do you think 
these changes will take care of the two problems you 
mention? 
1. Page 24, n . 23: Continue the first 
paragraph rather than starting a new paragraph, as 
follows: "We need not decide in this case whether 
the death sentence would be impaired in other 
circumstances, for example, if the jury's finding 
of an aggravating circumstance relied on 
materially inaccurate or misleading information." 
2. Page 20: Continue the quotation after 
"540-541," as follows: :- ;c 
"There is no comparable hazard when the 
indictment or information is in several counts and 
the conviction is explicitly declared to rest on -
findings of guilt on certain of these counts, for 
in such instances there is positive evidence that 
the trier of fact considered each count on its own 
merits and separately from the others." Ibid. 
(footnote omitted). 
Then revise the following paragr~ph as follows: 
"The rationale of Thomas and Street applies 
to cases in which there is no uncertainty about 
the multiple grounds on which a general verdict 
rests. If, under the instructions to the jury, 
one way of committing the offense charged is to 
perform an act protected by the Constitution, the 
rule of these cases requires that a general 
verdict of guilt be set aside even if the 
defendant's unprotected conduct, considered 
,,,. --. - --2-
separately, would support the verdict. It is a 
difficult theoretical question whether the rule of 
Thomas and Street applies to the Georgia death 
penalty scheme. The jury's imposition of the 
death sentence after finding more than one 
aggravating circumstance is not precisely the same 
as the jury's verdict of guilty on a single-count 
indictment after finding that the defendant has 
engaged in more than one type of conduct, because 
a wider range of considerations enters into the 
former determination. On the other hand, it is 
also not precisely the same as the jury's 
rendition of guilty verdicts on each of several 
separate counts in a multiple-count indictment, 
because there is only a single death sentence and 
it does not rest solely on any one of the 
aggravating circumstances. We need not answer 
this question here. The second rule derived from 
Stromberg, embodied in Thomas and Street, applies 
only in cases in which the State has based its 
prosecution, at least in part, on a charge that 
constitutionally protected activity is unlawful. 
No such charge was made in respondent's sentencing 
proceeding." 
: ~ 
If these changes are acceptable to you and, if no 




Justice White ~ 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
.§nµrmtt <!Jen.rt 11f f1rt ~th ~talt.s-
Jirag Jringhm. ~. <!J. 2 0 §Jl. ~ 
CHAMBERS Of" 
.JU STICE BYRON R. W HIT E May 24, 1983 
Re: 81-89 - Zant v. Ste phens 
Dear John, 
I doubt that we are yet on the same 
wave length. I shall be back to you in 
✓ 
due course. Meanwhile, I am sending a copy 
of my letter to you of May 23 to the other 
members of t h e Conference. 
Sin4:~ 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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Re: 81-89 - Zant v. Stephens 
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June l0 , 1983 
Continuing our Stromberg discussion, I am considering filing the 
following separate opinion: 
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
In Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891), the 
defendant in a criminal case was found guilty on five of eleven 
counts on which the jury was instructed. The verdict was a 
general one and one six-year sentence was imposed. On appeal to 
this Court, the conviction and sentence were affirmed, the Court 
saying that the first "count and the verdict of guilty returned 
upon it being sufficient to support the judgment and sentence, 
the question of the sufficiency of the other counts need not be 
considered." Similarly, in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109 (1959), a defendant was convicted on each of five counts, and 
a general sentence was imposed. The Court said, id. at 115, 
"Since this sentence was less than the maximum-punishment 
authorized by the statute for conviction under any one Count, the 
judgment below must be upheld if the conviction upon any of the 
Counts is sustainable." It is therefore clear that in cases such 
as Claassen and Barenblatt, there is no Stromberg, Thomas or 
Street problem. 
Here, the jury imposing the sentence found three aggravating 
circumstances and based on all the evidence imposed the death 
sentence. One of the aggravating circumstances was found invalid 
on appeal, and the claim is that under Stromberg, Thomas and 
Street, the death sentence must be s~t aside. I agree with the 
Court that there is no such problem since the evidence supporting 
the invalid aggravating circumstance was properly before the 
jury. The Court, however, suggests that if the evidence had been 
inadmissible under the federal constitution, there might be a 
- -
Stromberg, Thomas or Street problem. The Court says, ante at_, 
"The jury's imposition of the death sentence after finding more 
than one aggravating circumstance ••• is also not precisely the 
same as the jury's rendition of guilty verdicts on each of 
several separate counts in a multiple-count indictment, because 
there is only a single death sentence and it does not rest solely 
on any one of the aggravating circumstances." But in Claassen 
and Barenblatt, there was only one sentence and one could be no 
surer there than here that the sentence did or did not rest on 
any one of the counts. Those cases, however, would sustain the 
sentence if it was authorized under any of the valid counts. The 
Court's statement, therefore, calls these cases into question, 
and. to this extent I am in disagreement with the Court's opinion. 
Thus in my view there would be no Stromberg-Thomas-Street 
problem, as such, if the invalid count had rested on 
constitutionally inadmissible evidence. But since the jury is 
instructed to take into account all the evidence, there would 
remain the question whether the inadmissible evidence invalidates 
the sentence. Perhaps it would, but at least there would be room 
for the application of the harmless error rule, which would not 
be the case, it seems to me, under the per se rule of Stromberg, 
Street and Thomas. 
Except for the foregoing, I join the Court's opinion and its 
judgment as well. 
Justice Stevens 
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No. 81-89 
Zant v. Stephens 
Dear Thurgood, 
-
Please join me in your dissent in 
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